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ARTICLES
THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT
J. MARIA GLOVER*
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were originally based upon a straightforward
model of adjudication: Resolve the merits of cases at trial and use pretrial
procedures to facilitate accurate trial outcomes. Though appealing in principle, this
model has little relevance today. As is now well known, the endpoint around which
the Federal Rules were structured—trial—virtually never occurs. Today, the vast
majority of civil cases terminate in settlement. This Article is the first to argue that
the current litigation process needs a new regime of civil procedure for the world of
settlement.
This Article begins by providing a systemic analysis of why the Federal Rules
inadequately prevent settlement outcomes from being distorted relative to the
underlying merits—as defined by reference to substantive law—of a given dispute. It
then explains how the Federal Rules can actually amplify these distortions. Indeed,
notwithstanding the well-worn adage that settlement	
   occurs	
   in	
   the	
   “shadow	
   of	
   the	
  
law,”	
   scholars	
   have	
   shown	
   that	
   non-merits factors exert significant influence on
settlement outcomes. However, these insights have not been considered together and
combined with a systemic focus on the ways in which the influence of these factors on
settlement outcomes is actually a product of the basic structural features of the
Federal	
  Rules.	
  This	
  Article	
  takes	
  these	
  next	
  steps	
  to	
  explain	
  that	
  the	
  “shadow	
  of	
  the	
  
law”	
   that	
   is	
   cast	
   on	
   settlements	
   is	
   fading.	
   Further,	
   this Article discusses a new
phenomenon in the current litigation environment—namely,	
  that	
  litigants’	
  increased	
  
reliance	
   on	
   prior	
   settlements	
   as	
   “precedent”	
   for	
   future	
   settlement	
   decisions	
   may	
  
move	
   settlement	
   even	
   further	
   out	
  of	
   the	
   “shadow	
   of	
   the	
   law”	
   and	
   into	
   the	
   “shadow	
   of	
  
settlement”	
  itself.
This Article then traces these problems to three foundational assumptions
underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, all of which have become outmoded
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in a world of settlement. In rethinking these assumptions, it provides a new
conceptual account that contextualizes previously isolated procedural reform
proposals as challenges to these foundational assumptions. It also explains how these
reform efforts ought to be refined and extended with a specific view toward
systematically redesigning the basic model and operation of the Federal Rules for a
world of settlement. Lastly, it sets forth new proposals that seek to reorient current
rules expressly toward the goal of aligning settlement outcomes with the merits of
underlying claims.
What emerges is a new vision of procedure—one in which the application of pretrial
procedural rules do not merely facilitate trial but are designed to provide litigants
with guidance regarding the merits of claims and are used to align settlement
outcomes more meaningfully with the dictates of the substantive law. In describing
this vision, this Article lays the groundwork for the design of a new Federal Rules of
Civil Settlement.

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................... 103
I. LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE
DISAPPEARANCE OF TRIALS AND THE RISE OF SETTLEMENT ................... 106
II. THE VANISHING SHADOW OF THE LAW AND THE GROWING SHADOW
OF SETTLEMENT................................................................................................ 113
A. The Vanishing Shadow of the Law ................................................. 115
1. Overshadowed Shadows: Pretrial Procedures
Inadequately Address the Impact of Non-merits
Factors on Settlement Outcomes ............................................. 115
a. Litigation Costs ...................................................................... 116
b. Informational Imbalances................................................. 120
c. Variance.................................................................................... 122
2. Faint Shadows: Pretrial Procedures Fail To Provide
Parties with Robust Merits-Related Guidance for
Settlement ........................................................................................ 125
a. Pretrial Adjudicative Procedures Generate
Limited Merits Guidance ................................................... 126
b. Robust Merits Evaluation Occurs Too Late in the
Litigation Process To Influence Settlement
Outcomes ................................................................................. 127
c. Pretrial Merits-Screening Procedures
Sometimes Fail on Their Own Terms ........................... 128
d. Scarce Trials and Current Pretrial Managerial
Judging Practices Do Not Cure These Problems ...... 131
B. Eclipsing the Shadow of the Law: Settlements in the
Shadow of Settlement ......................................................................... 133
III. TOWARD THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT ............................. 138
A. Redesigning Procedure for a World of Settlement by
Reconsidering Core Assumptions of the Federal Rules ........... 139
1. Rethinking the Assumption that Plenary Discovery

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1958615

GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2012]

11/15/2012 9:26 AM

THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT

103

Aligns Case Outcomes with the Merits ................................... 140
2. Rethinking the Assumption that the Proper Role of
Pretrial Adjudicative Mechanisms Is Limited to
Screening Out Meritless Cases .................................................. 143
a. Harnessing Pleading-Stage Procedural
Mechanisms To Provide More Robust MeritsBased Guidance ..................................................................... 144
b. Creating Post-Pleading-Stage Mechanisms that
Provide Meaningful Merits-Based Guidance ............. 152
3. Rethinking the Assumption that Procedural Rules
Should Apply Uniformly and Transsubstantively to All
Cases................................................................................................... 156
B. A New Vision of Procedures Designed for a World of
Settlement ............................................................................................... 164
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 166
INTRODUCTION

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules), enacted in
1938, were designed to achieve a fundamental goal: to facilitate the
resolution of cases on their merits.1 To accomplish that goal, the
reformers behind the Federal Rules eschewed technical formalities in
favor of a streamlined procedural system, one for which plenary truthseeking	
   followed	
   by	
   trial	
   was	
   the	
   “gold	
   standard.”2 However, federal
1 5 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1182
(3d ed. 2004) (stating that a basic philosophy of the Federal Rules is to facilitate a
“determination	
   of	
   litigation	
   on	
   the	
   merits”);	
   see also Mark Herrmann, James M. Beck &
Stephen B. Burbank, Debate, Plausible Denial: Should Congress Overrule Twombly and Iqbal?,
158
U.
PA.
L.
REV.
PENNUMBRA
141,
148
(2009),
http://www.pennumbra.com/debates/pdfs/PlausibleDenial.pdf	
   (“The	
   drafters of the
Federal Rules objected to fact pleading because it . . . too often cut[] off adjudication on the
merits.”);	
  Jay	
  Tidmarsh,	
  Pound’s	
  Century,	
  and	
  Ours, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 513, 527 (2006)
(stating that one goal of the new procedural rules was “the	
   resolution	
   of	
   cases	
   on	
   their	
  
substantive merits”).
2 Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1, 5 (2010) [hereinafter Miller, From Conley]; see also
Tidmarsh, supra note 1,	
   at	
   549	
   (“[O]ur	
   procedural	
   system	
   is	
   structured	
   around	
   the	
   belief	
  
that a case will be resolved at a culminating, all-issues	
   jury	
   trial.”).	
   To	
   be	
   sure,	
   the	
   1938	
  
reformers were aware of settlement as a means of case resolution. See Edson R. Sunderland,
Scope and Method of Discovery Before Trial, 42 YALE L.J. 863,	
   864	
   (1933)	
   (“[O]ne	
   of	
   the	
  
greatest uses of judicial procedure is to bring parties to a point where they will seriously
discuss	
   settlement.”).	
   Given	
   the	
   relative	
   simplicity	
   of	
   cases	
   in	
   1938,	
   however, trials were
much more likely to occur and were much shorter than modern trials—the length of which
ballooned after the 1960s. See Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 567–68; see also Marc Galanter,
The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State
Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 477 (2004).
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civil cases today are virtually never resolved through trial.3 Rather,
settlement has emerged as the dominant endgame.
The modern system of litigation today faces the same fundamental
problem that vexed the 1938 reformers. As was true then, there is
reason to worry that case outcomes—now the product of
settlements—correspond to the legal merits of a given dispute4 in only
the coarsest of ways.5 Ironically, the disorder afflicting the current
system represents a new strain that draws much of its strength from
the very set of rules designed in 1938 to cure it.
Because the drafters of the Federal Rules placed the mechanisms
for robust merits adjudication at the end of the litigation process,6
those mechanisms are largely unavailable to influence settlement
outcomes in a world without trials. As a result, the task of ensuring
that settlement outcomes reflect the merits has fallen to procedural
rules governing the pretrial phases of litigation. However, this is a task
for which those rules were not principally designed, and there is
reason to believe that it is a task for which they are not particularly
well-suited.
Indeed, pretrial procedural rules tend not to mitigate, and
sometimes amplify, the impact of factors unrelated to case merits on
settlement outcomes. Moreover, by design, current pretrial rules are
generally	
  insufficient	
  to	
  inform	
  robustly	
  the	
  parties’	
  understanding	
  of	
  
3

See infra Part I.
By	
   “the	
   legal	
   merits	
   of	
   a	
   given	
   dispute,”	
   I	
   refer	
   to	
   the	
   application	
   of	
   underlying	
  
substantive law to the relevant facts of a case. I do not, however, equate	
   “the	
   merits”	
   of	
  a	
  
dispute with a plenary, unlimited opportunity on the part of litigants to develop their claims
through the potentially maximal use of procedural tools—a	
  conception	
  of	
  “the	
  merits”	
  that	
  
may more fully encapsulate the scholar Roscoe Pound’s	
  view	
  of	
  a	
  decision	
  “on	
  the	
  merits.”	
  
See Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform, 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 401 (1909–1910)
(“With	
  respect	
  to	
  .	
  .	
  .	
  rules	
  of	
  procedure,	
  we	
  should	
  make	
  nothing	
  depend	
  upon	
  them	
  beyond	
  
securing to each party his substantive rights—a	
  fair	
  chance	
  to	
  meet	
  his	
  adversary’s	
  case	
  and	
  
a	
   full	
   opportunity	
   to	
   present	
   his	
   own.”);	
   see also Jay Tidmarsh, Resolving	
   Cases	
   “On	
   the	
  
Merits,” 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 407,	
   413	
   (2010)	
   (“It	
   is	
   the	
   guarantee	
   of	
   a	
   full	
   opportunity—
unfettered by concerns for expense, delay, or advancing certain political interests—that
defines	
  the	
  ‘on	
  the	
  merits’	
  principle.”).	
  Further,	
  there	
  is	
  of	
  course	
  an	
  inherent	
  uncertainty	
  in	
  
litigation. Merits-based guidance would lead not to a single, objective result; instead, such
guidance could align a range of potential outcomes more closely with the dictates of
governing law.
5 See generally Owen M. Fiss, Comment, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1088
(1984)	
   (“The	
   problems	
   of	
   settlement	
   are	
   not	
   tied	
   to	
   the	
   subject	
   matter of the suit, but
instead stem from factors that are harder to identify, such as the wealth of the parties, the
likely post-judgment history of the suit, or the need for an authoritative interpretation of
law.”).
6 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Twombly, Pleading Rules, and the Regulation of Court Access,
94 IOWA L. REV. 873, 891–92 (2009) [hereinafter Bone, Regulation of Court Access]	
   (“Charles	
  
Clark . . . chief architect of the 1938 Federal Rules . . . believed that merits screening should
take place after	
  discovery,	
  at	
  summary	
  judgment	
  in	
  some	
  cases	
  and	
  at	
  trial	
  in	
  most.”).
4
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the merits of a given dispute. As a consequence,	
   the	
   “shadow	
   of	
   the	
  
law”7 cast upon settlement outcomes is growing faint. To make matters
worse, distorted settlement outcomes increasingly influence other
settlements, thus propagating the original distortions.8 The world of
modern litigation is therefore transforming into one in which
bargaining takes place in the shadow of earlier bargains.
This Article is the first to examine systematically the
maladaptiveness of the Federal Rules to a world of settlement and to
call for fundamental reform in light of that maladaptiveness. Part I
provides a brief historical account of the Federal Rules and traces the
progression from a world in which cases were frequently resolved by
trial to a world now dominated by settlement. This Part also notes the
transformation of the judicial role over the past few decades from one
of adjudication to one of case management and settlement facilitation.
Part II explores how pretrial procedural mechanisms, designed
largely	
   as	
   “way-stations”	
   on	
   the	
   road	
   to	
   trial,	
   fail	
   to	
   promote and at
times hinder meaningful merits-based settlement terms. Moreover,
distorted settlements become magnified by the feedback effects
settlements have on future settlement outcomes, foreshadowing a
world in which settlements occur less in the shadow of substantive law
and more in the shadow of other distorted settlements.
Part III traces the source of many of these problems to three
foundational assumptions underlying the Federal Rules—assumptions
that the world of settlement has undermined. Those assumptions are
(1) that a regime of plenary discovery facilitates the alignment of case
outcomes with the merits; (2) that the proper role of pretrial
adjudicative mechanisms is limited to screening out meritless cases;
and (3) that procedural rules should apply the same way to all kinds of
7 The	
   “shadow	
   of	
   the	
   law”	
   phraseology	
   was	
  first	
  introduced	
   by	
   Robert	
   H.	
   Mnookin	
   and	
  
Lewis Kornhauser. See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979). Mnookin and Kornhauser use that
metaphor to describe a confluence of factors that affect settlement outcomes, including the
entitlements	
   created	
   by	
   governing	
   law,	
   parties’	
   preferences,	
   transaction	
   costs,	
   parties’	
  
attitudes	
   toward	
   risk,	
   and	
   strategic	
   behavior.	
   When	
   I	
   refer	
   to	
   the	
   “shadow	
   of	
   the	
   law,”	
   I	
  
focus on the extent to which legal entitlements created by governing law (and the
application of law to underlying facts) impact negotiated outcomes. See generally Stephanos
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2463, 2464 (2004)
(“The	
   conventional	
   wisdom	
   is	
   that	
   litigants	
   bargain	
   toward	
   settlement	
   in	
   the	
   shadow	
   of	
  
expected	
   trial	
   outcomes.”);	
   Ben	
   Depoorter,	
   Essay,	
   Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The
Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 957,	
  975	
  (2010)	
  (“[P]rior	
  settlements	
  
are a benchmark or reference point from which to consider the merits of future, similar
cases.”).
8 See Depoorter, supra note 7, at 976	
   (“[Sixty-five] percent of [surveyed] lawyers
agreed	
  that	
  ‘[i]t	
  is	
  helpful	
  to	
  refer	
  to	
  settlements	
  in	
  similar	
  cases	
  that	
  are	
  favorable	
  to	
  your	
  
case	
  when	
  in	
  front	
  of	
  a	
  judge	
  in	
  settlement	
  conferences.’”).
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cases (uniformity) and to all types of substantive claims
(transsubstantivity). Rethinking these assumptions provides the
necessary foundation for redesigning a system that better aligns
settlement outcomes with the substantive law under which litigation
arises.9 In setting forth this framework, Part III also reviews a number
of distinct reforms and reform proposals and explains how, in fact,
they fit together as parts of a broad and unified reaction to the
problems with the Federal Rules identified in Parts II and III.
Moreover, once viewed through the lens of this Article, it becomes
clear that these proposals ought to be further refined and expanded
and that new examples of the sorts of reforms that would break free
from these outmoded tenets are needed. This framework is offered for
use by scholars, the Rules Advisory Committee, organizations like the
Federal Judicial Center, and—when appropriate—Congress as a basis
for redesigning the Federal Rules for a world of settlement.
What emerges from the challenges to these foundational
assumptions,	
   as	
   well	
   as	
   this	
   Article’s	
   suggestions	
   of	
   the	
   types	
   of	
  
reforms that would break free from them, is a new vision for a
procedural system designed for a world of settlement—in particular,
one that would convert what is now a largely detached relationship
between pretrial procedure and the substantive merits of a given case
into one of interdependence. Accordingly, procedural mechanisms
should be harnessed to provide meaningful merits-based information
to	
   guide	
   parties’	
   settlement	
   decisions,	
   and	
   judicial	
   evaluation	
   of	
   the	
  
merits through these mechanisms should have operational
consequences	
  for	
  determining	
  parties’	
  access	
  to	
  additional	
  procedures,	
  
especially those that have a tendency to create settlement distortions.
In short, this Article begins to lay the foundation for the redesign of
current procedural rules for a world of settlement.
I
LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: THE DISAPPEARANCE
OF TRIALS AND THE RISE OF SETTLEMENT

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, adopted in 1938,
represented a significant departure from both common law and code
systems of procedure and embraced instead the more discretionary

9 To be clear, this Article works within the existing realities of litigation; although the
challenges to the Federal Rules are fundamental, they reflect the world in which we live
rather than the world we might ideally want. Thus, I do not suggest that we jettison trials
altogether, that parties who wish to go to trial be prevented from doing so, or that the
existing Federal Rules fail to align outcomes with the merits in the rare cases that go to
trial—questions I defer to future work.
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and individualized principles that had been used in courts of equity.10
The 1938 reformers sought primarily to eliminate procedural
technicalities that prevented cases from being resolved on their merits
through the application of substantive law to the facts11 and that stood
as an obstacle to justice for ordinary citizens.12 To achieve this goal, the
Federal Rules embraced a relatively simple model of adjudication:
Cases were to be resolved on their merits at trial (by jury where
appropriate)13 following plenary discovery,14 and following pretrial
10 See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); see also, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P.
1, 11, 12(e), 13, 14, 15, 19(b), 20, 23, 26(b)(1), (c), (d), 35(a), 37(a)(4), (b)(2), 39(b),
41(a)(2), (b), 49, 50(a), (b), 53(b), 54(b), (c), 55(c), 56(c), 59(a)(1), 50(b)(1), 60(b)(6), 61,
62(b), 65(c) (following the tradition of equity courts in providing, either explicitly or
implicitly, for judicial discretion, compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 29 (1912) (repealed 1938),
available
at
http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pd
f); FED. R. CIV. P. 2 (providing for a single form of action and abolishing multiple forms and
procedural distinctions); FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (drawing upon Equity Rule 30 to set forth general
rules of pleading, claims for relief, affirmative defenses, and a requirement that pleadings be
concise and direct, compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 25, 30 (1912) (repealed 1938), available at
http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pd
f); FED. R. CIV. P. 18 (drawing upon Equity Rule 26 to provide for joinder of claims and
remedies, compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 26 (1912) (repealed 1938), available at
http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pd
f); FED. R. CIV. P. 19–22 (drawing upon the joinder provisions found in Equity Rules to
provide for broad joinder of parties, compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 29, 37 (1912) (repealed
1938),
available
at
http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pd
f); FED. R. CIV. P. 26–27 (significantly broadening discovery proceedings found under Equity,
compare R. PRAC. CT. EQUITY 58 (1912) (repealed 1938), available at
http://ia600505.us.archive.org/10/items/rulesofpracticef00unit/rulesofpracticef00unit.pd
f).
11 See, e.g., Charles E. Clark, Procedural Fundamentals, 1 CONN. B.J.	
   67,	
   68	
   (1927)	
   (“A	
  
procedural penalty can be supported only if it is a material aid in the better administration
of justice.”);	
  Charles	
  E.	
  Clark,	
  History, Systems and Functions of Pleading, 11 VA. L. REV. 517,
542	
   (1925)	
   (“Pleading	
   should	
   perform the office of only aiding in the enforcement of
substantive legal relations.”);	
  Charles	
  E.	
  Clark,	
  The Code Cause of Action, 33 YALE L.J. 817, 817
(1924) (describing state code reform efforts to reduce interference of technicalities with
“equitable	
   principles”);	
   James	
   William	
   Moore,	
   The New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 6
I.C.C. PRAC. J.	
   41,	
   42	
   (1938)	
   (“The	
   Federal	
   rules . . . epitomize the new objective of all
procedure . . . that litigation ought to be settled on the merits and not upon some procedural
ground.”);	
   see also Subrin, supra note	
   10,	
   at	
   986	
   (“Proponents of . . . the Federal Rules
wanted procedure to step aside so that cases	
  could	
  more	
  easily	
  be	
  decided	
  on	
  the	
  merits.”).
12 See Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of
Justice, 14 AM. LAW. 445, 447–48 (1906) (noting that procedural technicalities were creating
such contentiousness in civil litigation that ordinary people intensely desired to avoid
court).
13 Arthur R. Miller, Are	
   the	
   Federal	
   Courthouse	
   Doors	
   Closing?	
   What’s	
   Happened to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure?, 43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 587, 588 (2011) [hereinafter Miller,
Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing?].
14 See Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and
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processes that were designed to facilitate accurate trial outcomes. To
be sure, settlement was not foreign to the 1938 reformers.15 And
disposition of cases was possible through summary judgment, but
summary judgment was meant to be rare, and it was infrequently
granted in the years immediately following the adoption of the new
Federal Rules.16 Dispositive adjudication, to the extent it occurred, was
to come at trial or through directed verdict.17 This model of case
resolution dominated in 1938 and prevailed for many years
thereafter.18
While the Federal Rules have remained fundamentally unchanged
since 1938,19 the litigation landscape in which those Rules operate has
changed significantly. As is now well known, federal civil trials—the
fulcrum around which the Federal Rules were structured20—are now a
rarity.21
Proposals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (1978) (noting that the 1938 drafters
aimed to increase disclosure to reduce the adversarial nature of trial preparation); Charles
E. Clark, Pleading Under the Federal Rules, 12 WYO. L.J. 177, 188–90 (1958) (noting that the
1938	
   reformers	
   sought	
   to	
   place	
   “truth	
   ahead	
   of	
   cleverness	
   and	
   tactics”	
   and	
   to	
   enable	
  
citizens	
  “to	
  come	
  in	
  and	
  put	
  [their]	
  claim	
  before	
  the	
  judge”).
15 See, e.g., Sunderland, supra note	
   2,	
   at	
   864	
   (“[O]ne	
   of	
   the	
   greatest	
   uses	
   of	
   judicial
procedure is to bring parties to a point where they will seriously discuss settlement.”);	
  
Tidmarsh, supra note 4, at 414 (citing the predilections toward settlement held by Edson R.
Sunderland, one of the 1938 rule drafters).
16 See Robert J. Gregory, One Too Many Rivers To Cross: Rule 50 Practice in the Modern
Era of Summary Judgment, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 689,	
   689	
   (1996)	
   (“Historically, summary
judgment was a rarely used procedural device [and] [t]he standard formulation was that
summary	
   judgment	
   should	
   be	
   denied	
   whenever	
   there	
   was	
   the	
   ‘slightest	
   doubt	
   as	
   to	
   the	
  
facts.’”	
  (quoting	
  Armco	
  Steel	
  Corp.	
  v.	
  Realty	
  Inv.	
  Co.,	
  273	
  F.2d	
  483,	
  484 (8th Cir. 1960))).
17 Stephen C. Yeazell, Essay, The Misunderstood Consequences of Modern Civil Process,
1994 WIS. L. REV. 631, 636. In 1938, roughly sixty-three percent of adjudicated terminations
of cases terminated in trials and directed verdicts. Id. (citing 1938 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 1,
233).
18 Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing?, supra note 13, at 588.
19 There have been few major substantive amendments to the Federal Rules since their
adoption in 1938. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (amended in 1983 to require lawyers to certify
that	
   their	
   filings	
   are	
   supported	
   by	
   fact	
   and	
   law	
   after	
   an	
   “inquiry	
   reasonable	
   under	
   the	
  
circumstances”);	
   FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (amended in 1983 to encourage judges to exercise a
managerial role during pretrial settlement conferences); FED. R. CIV. P. 16, 26, 33, 34, 37, 45
(amended in 2006 to clarify that discoverable materials also cover electronic data); FED. R.
CIV. P. 26 (amended in 1970 to exclude attorney work product from discoverable
documents, in 1993 to require disclosure of certain documents at the outset of discovery,
and in 2000 to require parties to disclose those documents only if they intended to use them
“to	
  support	
  [their]	
  claims	
  or	
  defenses”).
20 See Miller, Are the Federal Courthouse Doors Closing?, supra note 13, at 588 (citing AM.
BAR ASS’N, PROCEEDINGS OF THE INSTITUTE ON FEDERAL RULES, CLEVELAND, OHIO 240 (William W.
Dawson ed., 1938) and Clark, supra note 14, at 177–80); see also Clark, supra note 14, at
193–95 (describing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as an adaptation of old civil
procedure rules to the needs of modern courts).
21 See, e.g., Charles A. Brown, Note, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in the District of
Maryland, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1247, 1252 n.37 (2011) (noting a trial rate of around 1.2% for
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This	
   change	
   “is	
  not	
   a	
  mere	
  difference	
  of	
  degree.”22 Various factors
have contributed to the decline of trials. The increase in the number of
criminal cases and private causes of action23 has caused crowded
dockets that create strong incentives for judges to encourage the
resolution of cases before trial.24 At the same time, cases have grown in
complexity and scope,25 especially in light of modern class action
practice,26 often making trial impracticable. In fact, as federal cases
civil court filings); Kevin M. Clermont, Litigation Realities Redux, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1919,	
   1956	
   n.184	
   (2009)	
   (“[T]he	
   Annual	
   Report	
   of	
   the	
   Director	
   of	
   the	
   Administrative	
   Office	
  
of the United States Courts . . . shows . . . current	
  [trial]	
  levels	
  approaching	
  1%.”).
22 Richard A. Nagareda, 1938 All Over Again? Pretrial as Trial in Complex Litigation, 60
DEPAUL L. REV. 647, 647 (2011) (citing Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination
of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 460
(2004)	
  (“[J]udges	
  conduct	
  trials at only a fraction of the rate that their predecessors did . . . .
[This is] a phenomenon that runs counter to the prevailing image of litigation in the United
States.”)).
23 See, e.g., David L. Cook et al., Criminal Caseload in U.S. District Courts: More than Meets
the Eye, 44 AM. U. L. REV.	
   1578,	
   1580	
   (1995)	
   (“Federal	
   judges	
   today	
   are	
   spending	
   a	
  
disproportionate amount of their time on criminal cases, due to the increase in defendants,
trials,	
   motions,	
   hearings,	
   and	
   sentencings.”);	
   see also generally J. Maria Glover, The
Structural Role of Private Enforcement Mechanisms in Public Law, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1137,	
  1148	
  (2012)	
  (describing	
  Congress’s	
  increasing departure in the last five decades from
reliance upon bureaucratic enforcement in favor of reliance upon ex post private litigation
as a basis of American regulatory enforcement).
24 See Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Don’t	
   Try:	
   Civil	
   Jury	
   Verdicts	
   in	
   a	
   System
Geared to Settlement, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1, 3, 59 (1996) [hereinafter Gross & Syverud, Don’t	
  
Try]	
   (noting	
   that	
   “[w]e	
   have	
   very	
   many	
   litigated	
   disputes	
   per	
   judge,	
   so	
   it	
   is	
   essential	
   that	
  
most	
  cases	
  be	
  resolved	
  without	
  judgment”).	
   But see Shari S. Diamond & Jessica Bina, Puzzles
About Supply-Side Explanations for Vanishing Trials: A New Look at Fundamentals, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 637, 638 (citing Galanter, supra note 22, at 500) (rejecting the notion
that a scarcity of judicial resources explains the vanished trial). The federal judiciary
continues to claim that the growing workload impairs its ability to handle its cases. E.g. id.
Despite suggestions that the addition of more judges would usher in a world of increased
trials, see, for example, John Lande, How Much Justice Can We Afford?:	
   Defining	
   the	
   Courts’	
  
Roles and Deciding the Appropriate Number of Trials, Settlement Signals, and Other Elements
Needed To Administer Justice, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 213, 248, it may well be that any room for
trials made by the addition of judges would simply be occupied by other cases waiting in the
wings. See George L. Priest, Private Litigants and the Court Congestion Problem, 69 B.U. L.
REV. 527, 554 (1989) (introducing the congestion equilibrium hypothesis).
25 See, e.g., Access to Justice Denied: Ashcroft v. Iqbal: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
the Constitution, Civil Rights & Civil Liberties of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 11
(2009) (statement of Arthur R. Miller, Professor, New York University School	
   of	
   Law)	
   (“The	
  
federal courts have become a world unimagined in 1938: a battleground for titans of
industry to dispute complex claims involving enormous stakes . . . and the situs for
aggregate litigation on behalf of large numbers of people and entities pursuing legal
theories	
  and	
  invoking	
  statutes	
  unknown	
  in	
  the	
  1930s.”).
26 See, e.g., Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of
Temporary Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2019–20 (1997) (discussing
Judge Weinstein’s	
  handling	
  of	
  In	
   re	
  “Agent	
  Orange”	
  Product	
  Liability	
  Litigation, 611 F. Supp.
1396	
  (E.D.N.Y.	
  1985),	
  a	
  complex	
  mass	
  tort	
  case,	
  in	
  which	
  he	
  “pressed	
  for	
  settlement”	
  while	
  
also creating an administrative-like regime to process individual claims); Richard A.
Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administration, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899, 902 (1996) (pointing
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have become more complex,27 the cost of litigating a case to trial has
become prohibitive, or at least undesirable, for many litigants. Further,
litigants—particularly repeat player defendants28—have consciously
adopted a strategy of avoiding trials to steer clear of juries and to
increase predictability of outcomes.29 And many litigants view
settlement as permitting more creative resolutions than the zero-sum
game of trial.30 Finally,	
   the	
   federal	
   civil	
   trial’s	
   decline	
   was	
   probably	
  
aided by Supreme Court rulings that provide for more robust judicial
intervention at various procedural steps prior to trial, including
summary judgment,31 class certification,32 the admissibility of expert
out that the rise of mass tort settlements occurred	
   “outside	
   preexisting	
   channels	
   of	
  
control”).
27 Scholars have noted that the prototypical lawsuit for which the 1938 Federal Rules
were designed was a relatively simple diversity case, not the often staggeringly complex
cases brought in federal court today. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory
Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494, 508 (1986) (noting that the prototypical case in
the minds of the 1938 drafters was one between	
   private	
   individuals	
   in	
   which	
   “tortious	
  
injury or breach of contract was claimed . . .	
  and	
  monetary	
  damages	
  were	
  sought”).
28 Marc Galanter, Why	
  the	
  “Haves”	
  Come	
  out	
  Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 L. & SOC. REV. 95,	
  97	
  (1974)	
  (describing	
  repeat	
  players	
  as	
  actors	
  “who	
  are	
  engaged	
  
in	
  many	
  similar	
  litigations	
  over	
  time”).
29 See Shari Diamond, Truth, Justice, and the Jury, 26 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 144
(2003)	
  (“The	
  general	
  theme	
  [among	
  civil	
  jury	
  critics]	
  is	
  that	
  a	
  group	
  of	
  laypersons	
  cannot	
  be	
  
trusted to find the truth and to administer even-handed	
  justice.”);	
  Marc	
  Galanter,	
  Real World
Torts: An Antidote to Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REV. 1093, 1095 (1996) (noting that critics of the
tort	
   system	
   believe	
   that	
   “[i]rresponsible	
   juries,	
   biased	
   against	
   deep-pocket defendants,
bestow windfalls on undeserving plaintiffs, particularly arbitrary and capricious damages
for pain and suffering and random outsize awards of punitive damages”);	
   Marc	
   Galanter,	
  
The Civil Jury as Regulator of the Litigation Process, 1990 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 201, 208 (1990)
(“Fear	
   of	
   juries	
   leads	
   defendants	
   to	
   settle	
   suits,	
   whatever	
   their	
   merits.”);	
   Wendy	
   Parker,	
  
Lessons in Losing: Race Discrimination in Employment, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 889, 921
(2006)	
  (“Defendants	
  fear	
  a	
  trial,	
  with	
  its	
  unpredictable outcome . . . .”).
30 See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway? A Philosophical and
Democratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663, 2674–75 (1995) (noting
that	
   settlement	
   enables	
   litigants	
   to	
   craft	
   solutions	
   that	
   offer	
   “greater	
   expression	
   of	
   the	
  
variety	
  of	
  remedial	
  possibilities	
  in	
  a	
  postmodern	
  world”).
31 In 1986, three decisions of the Supreme Court cemented a shift in the focal point of
litigation to the summary judgment stage. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,
256–57 (1986) (requiring the nonmovant, under the standard governing a directed verdict,
to provide affirmative evidence supporting a favorable verdict); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (easing the movant’s	
   burden	
   by	
   allowing	
   her	
   to	
   prevail	
   without	
  
proving the nonexistence of material facts); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (requiring the nonmovant, in the face of a judicial
determination	
   that	
   her	
   claims	
   are	
   “implausible,”	
   to	
   produce	
   affirmative	
   evidence	
   to	
   the	
  
contrary). Together, these three cases formalized the transformation of summary judgment
from a relatively unused—and even disfavored—procedure into a powerful resolver of
disputes. See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About
Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73, 87–89, 95 (1990); Joe S. Cecil et al., A Quarter-Century
of Summary Judgment Practice in Six Federal District Courts, 4 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 861,
906	
   (2007)	
   (demonstrating	
   that	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court’s	
   invigoration	
   of	
   the	
   summary	
  
judgment procedure confirmed, rather than started, the trend toward higher levels of
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evidence,33 and the pleading stage.34 These changes have helped to
ensure that the pretrial stage is now the focal point of litigation.
While trials have all but disappeared, settlement, though not a
completely new development in the world of litigation, has become the
dominant mode of civil dispute resolution. Today, most cases
terminate in settlement.35 The number is even higher for class
actions.36
The rise of settlement was reinforced by a shift in judicial
attitudes and approaches toward litigation. In particular, in the 1970s,
judges began to adopt a more managerial role over their cases in an
attempt to deal with growing dockets and to control costs.37 This
judicial intervention at the summary judgment stage).
32 See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011) (holding that in order
to certify a class, a court must find that the class has presented a common contention of
injury, the validity of which can be resolved in one stroke). A series of recent appellate court
decisions have called for more robust judicial scrutiny of merits-related issues at the class
certification stage. See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320, 324 (3d
Cir. 2008) (requiring judges to determine whether the requirements for class certification
under Federal Rule 23 are satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence); In re Pub. Offering
Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 37 (2d Cir. 2006) (same).
33 See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589–91 (1993) (stating that
expert testimony is only admissible if a judge deems it relevant, reliable, and grounded in
sound scientific methodology).
34 The Court recently ushered in demands for more robust judicial intervention at the
pleading stage of litigation. In two cases, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly¸ 550 U.S. 544, 561,
570 (2007), and Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), the Court abandoned the
longstanding	
   “no	
   set	
   of	
   facts”	
   pleading	
   standard	
   from	
   Conley v. Gibson, 335 U.S. 41, 45–46
(1957)	
  and	
  replaced	
  it	
  with	
  one	
  that	
  requires	
  a	
  complaint	
  to	
  “state	
  a	
  claim	
  to	
  relief	
  that	
  is	
  
plausible	
  on	
  its	
  face.”
35 See, e.g., Clermont, supra note	
  21,	
  at	
  1953	
  (noting	
  that	
  “the	
  settlement	
  rate	
  is	
  high”);	
  
Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most	
   Cases	
   Settle”:	
   Judicial	
   Promotion and Regulation of
Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1340 (1994) (referring to research indicating that, even
twenty-five years ago, seventy-eight percent of surveyed cases ended in settlement) (citing
Herbert M. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE 161, 162–
64 (1986)); Tidmarsh, supra note 1, at 555 (noting that eighty percent of cases end in
“settlement,	
  arbitration,	
  or	
  voluntary	
  dismissal”).
36 FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IMPACT OF THE CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT ON THE FEDERAL COURTS:
PRELIMINARY FINDINGS FROM PHASE TWO’S PRE-CAFA SAMPLE OF DIVERSITY CLASS ACTIONS 2
(2008),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/cafa1108.pdf/$file/cafa1108.pdf (finding that,
among diversity cases, every certified class action in its post–Class Action Fairness Act
(CAFA) study had terminated in settlement); see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332(d)(2), 1453
(expanding	
   federal	
   courts’	
   jurisdiction	
   under	
   the	
   diversity	
   statute	
   over	
   class	
   actions to
those in which the total amount in controversy exceeds $5 million). Rarely, but not never,
do such settlements follow a trial. See In re Vitamins Antitrust Litig., No. 99-197, 2003 WL
22089938, at *1 (D.D.C. Sept. 4, 2003) (noting	
  that	
  plaintiffs’	
  allegations regarding a global
cartel price-fixing vitamins resulted in a $49.5 million jury verdict before trebling, then the
parties settled the matter after trial but before judgment was entered).
37 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 376–77	
   (1982)	
   (“In	
  
growing numbers, judges . . . are meeting with parties in chambers to encourage settlement
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managerial	
  role	
  rapidly	
  evolved	
  from	
  one	
  aimed	
  at	
  the	
  “the	
  business	
  of	
  
adjudication”	
   to	
   one	
   aimed	
   at	
   “the	
   business	
   of	
   settlement.”38 Indeed,
available empirical evidence reveals not only that managerial judging
facilitates early case disposition,39 but also that it is frequently
conducted with that explicit goal in mind.40
Scholars have vigorously debated whether the rise of settlement is
desirable. Critics charge that settlement deprives the judicial system of
public pronouncements of the law41 and provides a vehicle through
which defendants, often with the aid of confidentiality agreements and
sealed court records, can conceal harmful practices from the public
eye.42 They also assert that managerial judging fails to increase
efficiency, and instead produces subjective or even arbitrary outcomes

of	
  disputes	
  and	
  to	
  supervise	
  case	
  preparation.”).
38 Resnik, supra note 27, at 528.
39 See EDWARD J. BRUNET, MARTIN H. REDISH & MICHAEL A. REITER, SUMMARY JUDGMENT:
FEDERAL LAW AND PRACTICE 38–39	
   (2d	
   ed.	
   2000)	
   (“Summary	
   judgment thereby enhances
settlement possibilities by eliminating sometimes troublesome and illusory issues from a
case.”); Peter Robinson, Settlement Conference Judge—Legal Lion or Problem Solving Lamb?
An Empirical Documentation of Judicial Settlement Conference Practices and Techniques, 33
AM. J. TRIAL ADV. 113, 132 (2009) (reporting that a majority of California judges surveyed
believed	
  that	
  they	
  were	
  “influential”	
  on	
  parties’	
  decisions	
  to	
  settle	
  “between 41% and 60%
of	
  the	
  time”).
40 The	
   idea	
   of	
   the	
   judge	
   as	
   “settlement	
   facilitator”	
   was	
   more	
   formally	
   cemented	
   by	
  
legislative enactments. See Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471, 482 (2006)
(emphasizing the importance of early judicial intervention to manage cases and requiring
every federal district court to promulgate an expense and delay reduction plan and to
conduct annual docket assessments); Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(PSLRA), Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 743, 758 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4
(2006)) (encouraging	
   judges	
   to	
  weed	
   out	
   “frivolous”	
  securities	
   cases	
   early	
   in	
   the	
   litigation).	
  
This role was further embedded as a result of the 1983 amendment to the Federal Rules of
Civil	
  Procedure	
  providing	
  that	
  “[a]	
  settlement	
  conference	
  is	
  appropriate	
  at	
  any	
  time”	
  during	
  
the	
  litigation,	
  and	
  that	
  “settlement	
  should	
  be	
  facilitated	
  at	
  as	
  early	
  a	
  stage	
  of	
  the	
  litigation	
  as	
  
possible,”	
   as	
   settlement	
   “obviously	
   eases	
   crowded	
   court	
   dockets and results in savings to
the litigants	
  and	
  the	
  judicial	
  system.”	
   FED. R. CIV. P. 16	
  advisory	
  committee’s	
  note. See also
Robinson, supra note 39, at 143, 146 (reporting that seventy-five percent of judges
surveyed are motivated to settle cases because settlement engenders a sense of
accomplishment,	
  and	
  that	
  ninety	
  percent	
  of	
  judges	
  believe	
  settlement	
  is	
  in	
  the	
  litigants’	
  best	
  
interests in upwards of sixty percent of their settlement conferences).
41 Fiss, supra note 5, at 1089. More broadly, scholars have also argued that settlement
deprives the litigation system of needed clarification of legal norms, David Luban,
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J. 2619, 2622–23 (1995), that it
prevents the public from learning about legal processes and outcomes, and that it prevents
our regulatory system from using litigation to place topics on the public agenda
independent of those that governmental institutions might place there, Judith Resnik,
Courts: In and out of Sight, Site, and Cite, 53 VILL. L. REV. 771, 804–06 (2008).
42 See Blanca Fromm, Bringing Settlement out of the Shadows: Information About
Settlement in an Age of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663, 663 (2001) (noting that the
details of settlements are usually hidden from the public via sealed court orders and
confidentiality agreements); Luban, supra note 41, at 2649 (same).
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because of its discretionary and non-transparent nature.43 Defenders
argue that settlements achieve cost savings to litigants and to the
judicial system,44 enable more flexible remedies,45 bring about greater
party satisfaction,46 eliminate some of the uncertainties and delays of
trial,47 and, in many instances, mean the difference between a deal for
injured plaintiffs and no compensation whatsoever, particularly in
cases of mass harm.48 Normative disagreements aside, however,
scholars agree on one thing: Settlement is here to stay.49
II
THE VANISHING SHADOW OF THE LAW AND THE GROWING SHADOW OF SETTLEMENT

The aspiration behind the 1938 Rules—that cases be resolved on
their	
   merits,	
   and	
   in	
   a	
   “speedy,	
   just,	
   and	
   inexpensive”50 manner—
remains laudable. But the affliction that the 1938 reformers sought to
43 See, e.g., E. Donald Elliot, Managerial Judging and the Evolution of Procedure, 53 U. CHI.
L. REV. 306, 316–18 (1986) (describing how the unavailability of certain legal safeguards in
settlement conferences encourages arbitrary decisions by judges); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old
Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 27, 42 (2003) [hereinafter Molot, An Old
Judicial Role]	
   (“[D]iscretionary management tactics that vary inordinately from judge to
judge	
  may	
  threaten	
  litigants’	
  due	
  process	
  rights . . . .”);	
  Jeffrey	
  A.	
  Parness,	
  Improving Judicial
Settlement Conferences, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1891, 1893–98	
   (2006)	
   (comparing	
   a	
   judge’s	
  
limited	
   “traditional	
   judicial	
   role”	
  with	
   the	
   discretionary,	
   informal,	
  and	
   overreaching	
   powers	
  
exercised in a settlement conference); Resnik, supra note 37, at 425–26 (describing a judge
whose	
  decisions	
   in	
   settlement	
  were	
  “made	
  privately,	
  informally,	
   off	
  the	
  record,	
  and beyond
the	
  reach	
  of	
  appellate	
  review”).	
  
44 See Galanter & Cahill, supra note	
   35,	
   at	
   1360	
   (“It	
   seems	
   probable	
   that	
   settlement
generally does involve the expenditure of fewer resources than adjudication.”).	
   However,	
  
Galanter and Cahill note that settlement may reduce costs asymmetrically; in other words,
some classes of litigants—primarily insurers—may capture a greater share of these cost
savings than others. Id. at 1363–64.
45 See Gross & Syverud, Don’t	
  Try, supra note	
  24,	
  at	
  7	
  (“Compromise . . . is the essence of
settlement . . . .”).	
  
46 See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 2693 (noting that settlement can be
“empowering,”	
  “participatory,”	
  and	
  “transformative”	
  for	
  litigants).
47 See, e.g., Samuel Issacharoff & Robert H. Klonoff, The Public Value of Settlement, 78
FORDHAM L. REV. 1177, 1196–99 (2009) (explaining how settlement in some cases is vastly
preferred to the potential delays and uncertainties litigation can introduce).
48 See id. at 1197–98 (noting that, absent settlement, plaintiffs who had been injured by
Vioxx	
  would	
  have	
  risked	
  a	
  defense	
  verdict,	
  “even	
  those	
  with	
  stronger	
  claims”).
49 Suzanna M. Meyers, Doing Their Jobs: An Argument for Greater Media Access to
Settlement Agreements, 14 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 603, 606 (2004); see also,
e.g., Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace Reform, 49 B.C. L.
REV. 367,	
  376	
  (2008)	
  (“Most	
  [lawsuits],	
  and	
  particularly	
  complex	
  cases,	
  settle	
  anyway,	
  and	
  
this	
  trend	
  toward	
  settlement	
  is	
  likely	
  to	
  increase.”); Nancy S. Marder, Introduction to Secrecy
in Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 305, 329 (2006) (noting that a pilot project creating a
settlement database for magistrate judges in Chicago started with the assumption that
“settlement	
   agreements	
   are	
   here	
   to	
   stay”);	
   Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 2664–65
(referring	
  to	
  settlement	
  as	
  “the	
  ‘norm’	
  for	
  our	
  system”).
50 FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
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remedy—case outcomes that do not meaningfully correspond to the
merits of the underlying claims51—has re-emerged in a new strain.
Current pretrial procedures insufficiently address, and at times
amplify, the effect on settlement outcomes of factors like cost
imposition, informational asymmetries, and variance (uncertainty of
settlement range outcomes). These external factors can have a
significant impact on settlement values.52 In addition, I argue, these
pretrial procedures, as a matter of design, fail to meaningfully inform
parties’	
   understanding	
   of	
   the	
   merits	
  of	
   the	
   dispute.53 Thus, the shadow
51 See Roscoe Pound, Some Principles of Procedural Reform (pt. 1), 4 ILL. L. REV. 388, 402
(1910)	
   (“[R]ules	
   of	
   procedure	
   should exist only to secure to all parties a fair opportunity to
meet the case against them and a full opportunity to present their own case; and nothing
should	
  depend	
  on	
  or	
  be	
  obtainable	
  through	
  them	
  except	
  the	
  securing	
  of	
  such	
  opportunity.”);	
  
see also Tidmarsh, supra note	
  1,	
  at	
  533	
  (noting	
  that	
  one	
  appealing	
  feature	
  of	
  Pound’s	
  view	
  is	
  
the	
  principle	
  of	
  resolving	
  cases	
  “on	
  the	
  merits”).	
  This	
  goal	
  is	
  sometimes	
  referred	
  to	
  as	
  one	
  of	
  
“accuracy.”	
   See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural
Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65,	
   65	
   (2010)	
   (describing	
   “accuracy	
   in	
   litigation”	
   as	
   producing	
  
outcomes that reflect the merits of a dispute). It is important to note, however, that
believing in a single correct answer to factual and legal questions is overly simplistic.
Tidmarsh, supra note	
   4,	
   at	
   409	
   (“[A]	
   single	
   correct	
   answer	
   to	
   either	
   factual	
   or	
   legal	
  
questions, or in the application	
   of	
   the	
   latter	
   to	
   the	
   former,	
   is	
   elusive.”);	
   cf. Lawrence B.
Solum, Procedural Justice, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 181, 247–50 (2004) (categorizing accuracy from
either ex ante or ex post perspective and describing tradeoffs between these two
perspectives). Accordingly,	
   when	
   I	
   say	
   that	
   settlement	
   outcomes	
   infrequently	
   reflect	
   “the	
  
merits”	
   of	
   an	
   underlying	
   dispute,	
   I	
   do	
   not	
   suggest that there is one perfect outcome for
every case; rather, I argue that merits-based guidance could better narrow a range of
possible outcomes in line with the dictates of governing substantive law as applied to fact.
52 These external factors may have a less significant impact on settlements in less
complex cases that involve no discovery. See Judith A. McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins,
Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785, 790–92 (1998) (reporting, based
on a study from 1978, that around fifty-two percent of cases in federal court involve no
discovery, and that discovery incidents track case complexity, number of parties, and
amounts at stake). This is particularly true given the costs associated with the discovery
process for more complex cases. See Scott A. Moss, Litigation Discovery Cannot Be Optimal
but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE
L.J. 889, 892 (2009) (stating that in federal cases involving discovery, discovery constitutes
half of all litigation costs, and in the most expensive five percent of cases, ninety percent of
litigation costs).
The numbers on discovery incidents are likely too low, particularly given the recent
explosion of electronic discovery. See, e.g., John H. Beisner, Discovering a Better Way: The
Need for Effective Civil Litigation Reform, 60 DUKE L.J. 547, 572 (2010) (pointing out that
most studies on discovery are out of date because they were conducted before the
“explosion	
   of	
   electronic	
   discovery” over the last decade, which hinders the resolution of
even routine cases). And it is important to note that statistics about the incidence of
discovery can be misleading: As Judge Frank Easterbrook has argued, the threat of
discovery may be as problematic as discovery itself. Frank H. Easterbrook, Discovery as
Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 635,	
   637	
   (1989)	
   (“[T]he	
   terms	
   of	
   settlement	
   are	
   affected	
   the	
   most	
  
when	
  the	
  parties	
  threaten	
  discovery	
  (explicitly	
  or	
  implicitly)	
  but	
  never	
  use	
  it.”).
53 To be clear, this Part does not argue that the merits of a dispute do not influence
settlement outcomes whatsoever, as has been asserted in the context of securities class
actions. See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in
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that governing substantive law	
   casts	
   upon	
   parties’	
  bargains	
  is	
   growing	
  
faint.
Moreover,	
  the	
  “precedents”	
  generated	
  in	
  a	
  world	
  of	
  settlement—
namely, prior settlement outcomes—may distort the existing
settlement market even further through feedback effects. Contrary to
the conventional account of settlements, characterized as unknown
and unknowable, empirical evidence reveals that prior settlement
outcomes, which internalize the various distortions mentioned above,
now serve as an increasingly important determinant of future
settlements. As the shadow of the law is fading, a new shadow is
emerging: the shadow of settlement.
A.

The Vanishing Shadow of the Law

Conventional wisdom holds that settlement occurs in the shadow
of the law54—more specifically, that legal entitlements created by
governing substantive law have a decided impact on settlement
outcomes. However, this conventional view is increasingly
questionable today. As this section traces, the pretrial procedural
mechanisms upon which the system of litigation now largely relies for
the resolution of disputes tend not to help meaningfully align
outcomes with the merits of given cases.
1.

Overshadowed Shadows: Pretrial Procedures Inadequately Address
the Impact of Non-merits Factors on Settlement Outcomes

Settlement outcomes are susceptible to the influence of a number
of non-merits factors. Indeed, as law and economics, finance-based,
and empirical models of modern litigation have revealed, litigation
costs, informational asymmetries, and variance can crowd out the
merits of a claim by influencing settlement outcomes.55 Psychological
Securities Class Actions, 43 STAN. L. REV. 497,	
   524	
   (1991)	
   (“Because the safety valve of
adjudication is not available, the strength of the case on the merits simply drops out of the
settlement	
   calculus.”).	
   Alexander’s	
   conclusions	
   have	
   been	
   challenged.	
  See, e.g., Tom Baker &
Sean J. Griffith, How	
   the	
   Merits	
   Matter:	
   Directors’	
   &	
   Officers’	
   Insurance	
   and	
   Securities	
  
Settlements, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 755, 757–59 (2009) (suggesting the veracity of Alexander’s	
  
claims	
   is	
   ambiguous	
   because	
   several	
   studies	
   “may	
   support	
   the	
   proposition	
   that at least
some	
  meritorious	
  claims	
  settle	
  higher	
  than	
  nonmeritorious	
  claims”).
54 Again,	
  by	
  the	
  “shadow	
  of	
  the	
  law,”	
  I	
  refer	
  to	
  the	
  view	
  that	
  legal	
  entitlements created
by governing law (and the application of law to underlying facts) guide negotiated
outcomes. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note	
  7,	
  at	
  2464	
  (“The	
  conventional wisdom is that litigants
bargain	
   toward	
   settlement	
   in	
   the	
   shadow	
   of	
   expected	
   trial	
   outcomes.”);	
   William	
   J.	
   Stuntz,	
  
Plea	
   Bargaining	
   and	
   Criminal	
   Law’s	
   Disappearing	
   Shadow, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2548, 2548
(2004)	
  (stating	
  that	
  the	
  settlement	
  market	
  in	
  civil	
  cases	
  “internalizes	
  the	
  governing	
  law”).
55 See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 401–03
(2004) (setting forth the economic model of litigation); Geoffrey P. Miller, Settlement of
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models	
   of	
   litigation	
   show	
   that	
   litigants’	
   cognitive	
   biases	
   tend	
   to	
  
exacerbate these problems.56
Existing literature on these phenomena is extensive and
illuminating. However, the insights of existing litigation models have
not been viewed together with a systemic focus on the ways in which
the impact of these forces on settlement is inevitable given modern
litigation practice under the Federal Rules. Indeed, only by viewing
these issues through the lens of the mismatch between the current
procedural rules and a world of settlement does it become clear that
these issues are in some ways the unsurprising products of rules that
were simply designed to do something else. The goal here is thus to
accept the central insights about these distortions of settlement
outcomes,57 expand upon them, and situate them within a larger
narrative about the functioning of the Federal Rules in a world of
settlement. By adopting this broader perspective, it is possible to see
how these distortions have become engrained in—and indeed are
perpetuated by—our system of civil procedure in a world of
settlement.
a.

Litigation Costs

Economic models of litigation, as well as recent empirical studies,
Litigation: A Critical Retrospective, in REFORMING THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 13, 13–37 (Larry
Kramer ed., 1996) (describing the economic model in detail). For a discussion of how the
threat of costs can overwhelm the merits, see Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Suing Solely To Extract
a Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 445–46 (1988) [hereinafter Bebchuk, Suing Solely],
and Jonathan T. Molot, How U.S. Procedure Skews Tort Law Incentives, 73 IND. L.J. 59, 69–72
(1997). For a discussion of how informational asymmetries can affect case outcomes, see
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Litigation and Settlement Under Imperfect Information, 15 RAND J.
ECON. 404, 409, 413–14 (1984). And for a presentation of a finance-based model of litigation
that focuses on variance as a driver of settlement outcomes, see Joseph A. Grundfest & Peter
H. Huang, The Unexpected Value of Litigation: A Real Options Perspective, 58 STAN. L. REV.
1267, 1278 (2006).
56 See, e.g., Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological Theory, 67 U. CHI.
L. REV. 163, 168–69 (2000) (proposing that, in frivolous lawsuits, plaintiffs are
“psychologically	
   inclined	
   toward	
  trial,”	
  and	
   defendants	
   are	
  “psychologically	
  inclined	
   toward	
  
settlement”);	
   George	
   Loewenstein	
   et	
   al.,	
   Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 138–40	
   (1993)	
   (discussing	
   “psychological	
   factors	
   that	
  
challenge [the Priest-Klein	
   model’s]	
   central	
   assumptions”);	
   Jeffrey	
   J.	
   Rachlinski,	
   Gains,
Losses, and the Psychology of Litigation, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 113,	
   128	
   (1996)	
   (“Predicting	
   the	
  
behavior of litigants . . . requires an understanding of whether a party views their decision
from	
  the	
  perspective	
  of	
  a	
  gain	
  or	
  loss.”).	
  
57 By	
   “distortions	
   of	
   settlement	
   outcomes,”	
   I	
   refer	
   to	
   the	
   phenomenon whereby the
operation of procedural rules in a particular case enables or amplifies the influence of nonmerits factors on settlement outcomes to such a degree that those factors may overwhelm
the	
   merits	
   of	
   the	
   claim.	
   And	
   when	
   I	
   refer	
   to	
   “distortion	
   of	
   settlement	
   ranges,”	
   I	
   refer	
   to	
   a	
  
shift in those ranges, either higher or lower, to a different set of minimum and maximum
values for reasons largely unrelated to the merits of the relevant case.
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strongly support the conclusion that litigation costs can significantly
affect settlement outcomes.58 It is well known that defendants will
sometimes pay more prior to trial and plaintiffs will sometimes settle
for	
   less	
   than	
   is	
   called	
   for	
   by	
   the	
   merits	
   of	
   plaintiffs’	
   claims	
   to	
   avoid	
  
litigation costs.59 Of course, the Federal Rules and their application by
the Supreme Court have attempted to take into account the effects of
cost imposition on litigation outcomes.60 Moreover, there are obvious
reasons to suppose that the optimal litigation cost is not zero.61
Nonetheless, the Federal Rules inadequately direct litigation costs
toward the generation of merits-based signals, and therefore in cases
litigated under the Federal Rules, litigation costs—or the threat of
58 See SHAVELL, supra note 55, at 401–03 (outlining the basic economic model of
litigation); Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Settlement of Litigation, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE
DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 442, 442, 445 (Peter Newman ed., 1998) (discussing
the effects of litigation costs on the likelihood and terms of settlement). For empirical work
reporting that eighty-three percent of responding lawyers agreed that costs, and not the
merits of a case, were the deciding factor in settlement decisions, see AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAW.
TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., INTERIM REPORT
ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK FORCE ON DISCOVERY
AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM, at A-6 (2008),
available at http://druganddevicelaw.net/ACTL%20Discovery%20Report.pdf.
59 See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement
Negotiations and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 323–24 (1991)
[hereinafter Gross & Syverud, Getting to No]	
  (“[The]	
  plaintiff’s	
  minimum	
  settlement	
  demand	
  
[equates to] the plaintiff’s	
   estimate	
   of	
   the	
   expected	
   judgment	
   at	
  trial,	
   minus	
   the	
   plaintiff’s	
  
litigation	
  costs.	
  Similarly,	
  the	
  defendant’s	
  maximum	
  settlement	
   offer	
  equals	
  the	
  defendant’s	
  
estimate of the expected	
  judgment	
  at	
  trial,	
  plus	
  the	
  defendant’s	
  litigation	
  costs.”	
  (emphases	
  
omitted) (citing George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation,
13 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1984))); Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 98
(“[Assuming]	
   the	
   plaintiff’s	
   expected	
   value	
   of	
   going	
   to	
   trial	
   is . . . $725,000 [and] the
defendant’s	
   expected loss is $850,000 . . . [t]he plaintiff would prefer any settlement that
provided a payment greater than $725,000 and the defendant would prefer any settlement
that	
  provided	
  a	
  payment	
  less	
  than	
  $850,000.”);	
  Miller,	
  From Conley, supra note 2, at 65	
  (“It	
  
is reasonable to assume that litigation cost is a factor that may encourage or induce one or
more parties to settle in some cases.”).	
  
60 For instance, the Supreme Court introduced a new plausibility pleading standard
partly out of concern that discovery costs may be incurred asymmetrically by defendants,
thus generating undue settlement pressure. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685 (2009)
(stating that	
  it	
  is	
  “quite	
  likely”	
  defendants	
  must	
  participate	
  in	
  discovery	
  despite	
  promises	
  of	
  
deferral from plaintiffs); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 559 (2007) (concluding
that unnecessary discovery costs will be avoided by requiring sufficient conspiracy
allegations). For an economic discussion of litigation as a vehicle to extract settlement
through the imposition of costs, see Bebchuk, Suing Solely, supra note 55, at 437–38.
61 For instance, some modicum of discovery costs is needed to compel the disclosure of
information that would otherwise remain in the hands of the defendant, see, for example,
Robert J. Rhee, A Price Theory of Legal Bargaining: An Inquiry into the Selection of Settlement
and Litigation Under Uncertainty, 56 EMORY L.J. 619, 676–77 (2006) [hereinafter Rhee, A
Price Theory], where the author explains how information disclosure will reduce
informational uncertainty and thus lower litigation costs by encouraging earlier settlement,
and is justified by the promise of vindicating a potentially meritorious claim.
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them—have the potential to overshadow the merits as a significant
driver of settlement outcomes.
For starters, the transformation of pretrial procedures into
significant, often terminal, litigation events has substantially increased
the absolute costs attendant to those procedures. In some cases, these
costs can together exceed the costs of trial.62 All other things equal, the
threat of these costs—separate and apart from the merits-based
information such costs might generate—can cause parties to revise
settlement estimates.63 In some cases, settlement values will be shifted
systematically downward (or upward) because under-resourced
plaintiffs (or defendants) cannot proceed, or at least credibly threaten
to proceed, deep into the litigation process.64 Similar effects can occur
in cases involving a one-shot claimant whose stakes in an individual
case are asymmetrically low in comparison to those of a defendant
willing to expend disproportionate resources to set a low settlement
value as precedent for future cases or to cement a reputation for being
costly to sue.65
Pretrial procedural rules can also exacerbate the effect of
litigation costs to the extent those rules impose such costs
asymmetrically, either between the parties or temporally.66 As to who
must incur particular costs, all things being equal, the party facing
higher costs will settle on terms more favorable to the party facing
lower costs. As to when such costs are incurred,67 all things being equal,
a party who can defer the bulk of litigation costs until a later stage in
the litigation can generally achieve a shift in the settlement range in
her favor.68
62 See, e.g., John Bronsteen, Against Summary Judgment, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 522, 533
(2007) (noting that trial is often less expensive than discovery and pretrial motions).
63 See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 637 (stating that the threat of discovery costs
affects	
  settlement	
  terms	
  “most”).	
  
64 See, e.g., Elizabeth J. Cabraser, Uncovering Discovery 33 (May 10, 2010) (unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Duke%20Materials/Library/E
lizabeth%20Cabraser,%20Uncovering%20Discovery.pdf (noting an assumption by courts
that	
   litigants	
   have	
   “infinite”	
   resources	
   and	
   arguing	
   that	
   discovery	
   abuse	
   is	
   “diminish[ing]	
  
civil	
  litigation	
  into	
  a	
  game	
  for	
  the	
  rich”).
65 See generally Galanter, supra note 28, at 98–100 (describing how repeat players in
litigation accrue advantages through reputation building opportunities across multiple suits
and through interest and investment in rules governing particular outcomes).
66 Nagareda, supra note 22, at 659.
67 See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55, at 1312 (noting that a procedural rule that
causes litigation costs to be front-loaded	
   will	
   reduce	
   a	
   lawsuit’s	
   value	
   because a claimant
must incur larger expenses before gaining the advantage of the information disclosed at the
end of the first stage of the litigation).
68 See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuck & Howard F. Chang, The Effect of Offer of Settlement
Rules on the Terms of Settlement, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 489,	
  510	
  (1990)	
  (“[S]ettlement	
  terms . . .
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Asymmetrical cost imposition is usually most pronounced during
the discovery process. In general, access to discovery is granted
without limitation once a motion to dismiss is denied, enabling
claimants to impose significant, asymmetric production costs on the
opposing party.69 Moreover, claims that barely survive a motion to
dismiss generally trigger the same discovery entitlements as claims
that are more likely to succeed. Accordingly, a claimant will obtain a
“motion	
   to	
   dismiss	
   premium”	
   in	
   proportion	
   to	
   any	
   temporal	
   or	
  
absolute asymmetrical cost imposition in the discovery stage.70
The plenary discovery process also enables the imposition of
significant asymmetric costs upon plaintiffs.71 Defendants can exploit
the broad relevance standard under Rule 26(b) by inundating plaintiffs
with information,72 forcing them to drink from a fire hose—as if to say,
“Be	
  careful	
  what	
  you	
  ask	
  for.”	
  This	
  is	
  likely	
  to	
  be	
  particularly	
  acute	
  in	
  
situations where plaintiffs need discovery the most, because they do
tend	
   to	
   favor	
   the	
   party	
   with	
   lower	
   litigation	
   costs.”);	
   Samuel	
   Issacharoff	
   &	
   George	
  
Loewenstein, Unintended Consequences of Mandatory Disclosure, 73 TEX. L. REV. 753, 768–71
(1995) (describing how asymmetric costs in the discovery process increase the bargaining
power of the party imposing those costs).
69 See, e.g., Beisner, supra note 52, at 548 (illustrating the incentives that encourage the
imposition of excessive discovery costs); Easterbrook, supra note 52, at 637 (pointing out
that even the threat of discovery costs will have a meaningful impact on settlement terms);
Moss, supra note	
  52,	
  at	
  909	
  (citing	
  concerns	
  that	
  excessive	
  discovery	
  “induces	
  settlement	
  by	
  
imposing	
   high	
   costs	
   on	
   defendants”);	
   Doubles	
   A.	
   Rennie,	
   The End of Interrogatories: Why
Twombly and Iqbal Should Finally Stop Rule 33 Abuse, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 191 (2011)
(“[Interrogatories] are highly susceptible to abuse because it is so easy to impose costs on
an	
   adversary	
   with	
   them.”).	
   But see Linda S. Mullenix, The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive
Discovery Abuse: The Sequel, 39 B.C. L. REV. 683 (1998) (arguing that discovery is not a tool
of abuse given how rarely it is used and how minor a burden it usually imposes).
70 The Supreme Court was sensitive to the imposition of asymmetric discovery costs on
defendants	
  when	
  it	
  ushered	
  in	
  a	
  new	
  “plausibility”	
  pleading	
  standard in Twombly. 550 U.S.
at 559 (“[T]he	
   threat	
   of	
   discovery	
   expense”	
   can	
   lead	
   “cost-conscious defendants to settle
even	
  anemic	
  cases	
  before	
  reaching	
  those	
  proceedings”).	
  H owever, this indirect regulation of
discovery through pleading may do little to cure the imposition of asymmetrical costs. See
infra Parts II.A.2 and III.A.2 (explaining this risk).
71 See generally William B. Rubenstein, The Concept of Equality in Civil Procedure, 23
CARDOZO L. REV. 1865,	
   1882	
   (2002)	
   (“[L]iberal	
   discovery	
   can	
   also	
   work	
   against	
   poorer	
  
litigants [who] can be flooded with discovery requests.”).
72 See Cabraser, supra note 64, at 32 (describing how defendants can use discovery
procedures,	
   “with extremely [sic] effectiveness, as an offensive weapon, not simply a
defensive	
  shield,”	
  to	
  “financially	
  exhaust	
  their	
  opponents	
  in	
  the	
  initial	
  discovery	
  stages	
  of	
  a	
  
complex case long before ever reaching the point at which discovery of key material
information	
   becomes	
   imminent	
   and	
   inevitable”).	
   Cabraser	
   quotes	
   one	
   defense	
   attorney	
  as	
  
saying	
   “[t]he	
   aggressive	
   posture	
   we	
   have	
   taken	
   regarding	
   depositions	
   and	
   discovery	
   in	
  
general continues to make these cases extremely burdensome and expensive for plaintiffs’	
  
lawyers,	
   particularly	
   sole	
   practitioners.”	
   Id. at 22. Strikingly, that same defense attorney
went	
  on	
  to	
  say	
  that	
  “[t]o	
  paraphrase	
  General	
  Patton, the way we won these cases was not by
spending	
   all	
   of	
   [RJR	
   Tobacco’s]’s	
   [sic]	
   money,	
   but	
   by	
   making	
   that	
   other son of a bitch spend
all	
  of	
  his.”	
  Id.
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not	
  know	
  enough	
  about	
  defendants’	
  internal	
  workings	
  or	
  documents	
  to	
  
craft narrower requests. Many plaintiffs may simply buckle under the
sheer volume of information and the costs of sifting through it. Existing
ex post mechanisms	
  for	
  policing	
  “abusive”	
  discovery	
  practices	
  do	
  little	
  
to correct either of these distortions of settlement outcomes.73 As a
result,	
   the	
   Federal	
   Rules’	
   principle	
   of	
   “liberal”	
   discovery	
   can	
   obscure	
  
rather than reveal the merits.
Finally, the Supreme	
  Court’s	
  plausibility	
  pleading	
  standard	
  under	
  
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, cemented in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, imposes
new cost asymmetries against plaintiffs at the pleading stage of
litigation. The plausibility test now requires plaintiffs to expend
potentially significant additional investigatory resources to formulate
allegations simply to get into court.74 Those additional costs typically
do not lead to any incremental disclosure of facts by defendants, who
need not even deny the truth of those allegations in moving to
dismiss.75 The effect on settlement outcomes could well be a systematic
shift	
   downward	
   in	
   the	
   value	
  of	
   plaintiffs’	
   claims	
  in	
   all	
  cases—not just
those in which plaintiff might reasonably obtain relevant factual
information prior to discovery76—in line with the asymmetrical
litigation costs associated with the invigorated motion to dismiss.77
And	
   those	
   costs	
   may	
   not	
   be	
   trivial,	
   given	
   defendants’	
   increasing	
  
tendency to file complex, lengthy Twombly motions that exploit
claimants’	
   informational disadvantages.78 Consequently, the costs
generated by the new heightened pleading standard could cause
distortions in settlement valuations or, worse yet, serve as an outright
barrier to entry to the federal courts.
b.

Informational Imbalances

Informational imbalances also can have an impact on settlement
values. As early law and economics models recognized, these
asymmetries	
   can	
   prevent	
   the	
   convergence	
   of	
   the	
   parties’	
   settlement	
  

73

See supra Part II.A.1.a.
See, e.g., Miller, From Conley, supra note 2, at 67–68 (noting the added investigatory
requirement at the pleading stage imposed upon claimants by Twombly).
75 See Twombly¸ 550 U.S. at 572 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the Twombly
complaint	
   was	
   dismissed	
   “without	
   so	
   much	
   as	
   requiring	
   [defendants]	
   to	
   file	
   an	
   answer
denying	
  that	
  they	
  entered	
  into	
  any	
  agreement”).
76 See infra Part III.A.1.
77 See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55,	
   at	
   1312	
   (finding	
   that	
   a	
   plaintiff’s	
   option	
   to	
  
settle or continue with the litigation decreases in value with greater litigation costs, and
decreases more rapidly if those costs are front-loaded).
78 See infra note 84 and accompanying text (explaining the problems of selective judicial
notice).
74
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ranges.79 Although the Federal Rules contain some mechanisms for
curing informational asymmetries—specifically rules providing for
liberal pleading and discovery—they remain largely insensitive to the
distortive	
   effect	
   on	
   settlement	
   values	
   generated	
   by	
   parties’	
   strategic	
  
exploitation of those imbalances for settlement gain.80
The current discovery rules largely tolerate, and to some degree
amplify, strategic incentives to exploit informational imbalances. In a
world of complex, high-stakes cases, existing discovery mechanisms
provide defendants with opportunities to obscure key facts through
voluminous production and through aggressive use of privilege and
work product doctrine arguments. Defendants also can delay the
production of critical documents and information in order to prolong
informational asymmetries (and increase the associated asymmetrical
temporal	
  costs	
  discussed	
  above).	
  The	
  Federal	
  Rules’	
  tendency	
  toward	
  
limited and informal judicial supervision of discovery does little to
curb	
   defendants’	
   exploitation	
   of	
   informational	
   asymmetries	
   and	
  
accordingly permits the shift of settlement values downward in
response to strategic discovery behavior.
In addition, the heightened plausibility pleading requirement for
plaintiffs,81 combined with the fact that defendants need not even deny
the truth of the allegations at the motion to dismiss stage,82 means that
the defendant will enter the next stage of litigation with information
about how the claimant is likely to proceed through the litigation and
with a corresponding advantage at the bargaining table. More
fundamentally, the heightened pleading standard, in combination with
informational disadvantages to which plaintiffs may be subject prior to
any discovery, creates a risk that plaintiffs will plead too much in an
attempt to survive the motion to dismiss and unwittingly plead
themselves out of court.83
79

Bebchuk, supra note 55, at 404.
See generally Rubenstein, supra note 71, at 1876–81 (noting that equalizing
information	
   available	
   to	
   each	
   side	
   in	
   a	
   lawsuit	
   can	
   help	
   generate	
   “greater	
   equipage	
  
equality,”	
  which	
  “helps	
  ensure	
  the	
  accuracy . . . of adjudicated outcomes”).
81 The	
   heightened	
   “plausibility”	
   pleading	
   standard	
   was	
   introduced	
   by	
   the	
   Supreme	
  
Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, in which the Court held that a complaint must
contain	
  “enough	
  facts to	
  state	
  a	
  claim	
  to	
  relief	
  that	
  is	
  plausible	
  on	
  its	
  face.”	
  550	
  U.S.	
  544,	
  570	
  
(2007). In introducing this standard, the Court in Twombly rejected the long-standing
pleading standard articulated in Conley v. Gibson,	
   where	
   the	
   Court	
   held	
   that	
   “a	
   complaint	
  
should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the
plaintiff can prove no set of facts in	
   support	
   of	
   his	
   claim.”	
   355	
   U.S.	
   41,	
   45–46 (1957)
(emphasis added); Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563 (noting that the Conley standard	
  “has earned its
retirement”	
  and	
  that	
  Conley’s	
  “no	
  set	
  of	
  facts”	
  language	
  “is	
  best	
  forgotten	
  as	
  an	
  incomplete,	
  
negative	
  gloss	
  on	
  an	
  accepted	
  pleading	
  standard”).
82 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
83 See, e.g., U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Ind. Gas Co., 350 F.3d	
   623,	
   626	
   (7th	
   Cir.	
   2003)	
   (“A	
   litigant	
  
80
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Defendants can also exploit informational imbalances at the
pleading stage in Twombly motions. When armed with superior
information,	
   defendants	
   are	
   well	
   equipped	
   to	
   attack	
   the	
   “artfulness”	
  of	
  
the relevant pleading, tripping up claimants who may plead facts that,
in light of information of which defendants are uniquely aware, the
opposing party can make appear implausible or inconsistent.
Defendants can also inject selective facts into the plausibility
determination by invoking the judicial-notice mechanism to cast doubt
upon	
   the	
   plausibility	
   of	
   plaintiffs’	
   claims84 and to make required
responsive briefs more costly to produce. This advantage may
eliminate or reduce the value of various claims, and can create the
precise problem attendant to pleading that the 1938 reformers sought
to eliminate—the use of procedural traps, in place of the merits, to
dictate outcomes.
c.

Variance

High levels of variance, or unpredictability, in litigation outcomes
may also distort settlement values.85 As proponents of recent financebased models of litigation have pointed out, the pretrial phase of
litigation involves numerous sets of decisions, or options, which are
part of a multi-stage investment process. These models have
demonstrated that the level of variance in the price of a claim at any
given decision point in the litigation can significantly affect settlement
outcomes.86 In a more or less uncertain litigation environment,
variance can emerge, for instance, from the content of the substantive
may plead itself out of court by alleging (and thus admitting)	
  the	
  ingredients	
  of	
  a	
  defense.”).
84 See, e.g.,	
  Tellabs,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Makor	
  Issues	
  &	
  Rights,	
  Ltd.,	
  551	
  U.S.	
  308,	
  322	
  (2007)	
  (“Courts	
  
must consider . . . other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 12(b)(6)
motions to dismiss, in particular . . .	
  matters	
  of	
  which	
   a	
  court	
  may	
  take	
  judicial	
  notice.”);	
  see
also Reply Brief for Appellants at 20 n.10, Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 683 F.3d 845 (7th
Cir. 2012) (No. 08-cv-6910).
85 See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995) (Posner,
J.)	
  (noting	
  the	
  concern	
  of	
  “forcing	
  the[]	
  defendants to stake their companies on the outcome
of a single jury trial, or be forced by fear of the risk of bankruptcy to settle even if they have
no	
  legal	
  liability”);	
  Lauren	
  N.	
  Fromme,	
  Unreliable Securities for Retirement Income Security:
Certifying the ERISA Stock-Drop Loss, 64 VAND. L. REV. 301,	
   311	
   n.53	
   (2010)	
   (“The	
   ‘high	
  
variance’	
   associated with class-action litigation stems from the possibility of having one
enormous, aggregate verdict, as opposed to seeing losses spread out across multiple
jurisdictions.”);	
  Richard	
  A.	
  Nagareda,	
   Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future
of American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 30 (2009) (noting that settlement pressure
increases along with increases in variance).
86 See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55, at 1276–78. For additional finance-based
models of litigation, see generally Rhee, A Price Theory, supra note 61, where the author
constructs a pricing theory for legal disputes, and Robert J. Rhee, The Effect of Risk on Legal
Valuation, 78 U. COLO. L. REV. 193 (2007) [hereinafter Rhee, The Effect of Risk], where the
author argues that lawsuits should be viewed as assets.
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law, like a statute containing a treble damages provision; from the
option to proceed to a new procedural stage in the litigation, like the
option upon a denial of summary judgment to proceed to trial or the
option, after culling through materials produced in in a period of
discovery, either to gather additional information or not (and possibly
then settle); or from the option to proceed through litigation as a
certified class.87
High levels of variance in potential outcomes at any given point in
litigation can shift settlement values upward,88 because a defendant,
the primary bearer of variance-related risk, may choose to offload that
risk through a settlement, priced in accordance with some calculation
of	
  expected	
  value,	
  plus	
  an	
  offloading	
  premium	
  in	
  plaintiff’s	
  favor.89 This
effect of variance on settlement values can be further magnified by
common cognitive biases: Litigants tend to be risk-averse when faced
either with gains of moderate-to-high probability or with losses of low
probability; conversely, they tend to be risk-seeking in response to
low-probability gains or moderate-to-high-probability losses.90
Judicial interpretations of certain Rules are sensitive to some
degree to the possibility that variance can shift settlement values
upward for reasons unrelated to the merits. Variance concerns
underlie	
   in	
   part	
   the	
   Supreme	
   Court’s	
   decisions	
   in	
   the	
   summary	
  
87 See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55, at 1317 (tracing how variance can emerge
from changes in and use of both substantive and procedural rules).
88 Id. at	
  1276.	
  This	
  effect	
  depends	
  in	
  part	
  on	
  a	
  plaintiff’s	
  ability to reduce her litigation
expenditures sufficiently in case the lawsuit goes poorly from her perspective. Id. at 1315–
16.
89 The paradigmatic example of this phenomenon is the settlement that typically
follows the certification of a class action. The potential risk of a class-wide verdict
(variance) is often too large for the defendant to bear, so the defendant offloads the risk
through settlement. However, the extent to which the certification of a class action exerts
such a high level of settlement pressure	
  as	
  to	
  be	
  tantamount	
  to	
  “blackmail”—a charge levied
by Judges Easterbrook, Friendly, and Posner—is debatable. See Charles Silver, “We’re	
  Scared	
  
to	
   Death:”	
   Class	
   Certification	
   and	
   Blackmail, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1357,	
   1359	
   (2003)	
   (“[Many	
  
academics and] [e]mpirical researchers . . .	
  dispute	
  the	
  blackmail	
  claim.”).	
  
90 Rachlinski, supra note 56, at 130–60. Some studies indicate that attorneys can
mitigate these effects and lead clients to take a more risk-neutral approach to litigation
decisions. Russell Korobkin & Chris Guthrie, Psychology, Economics, and Settlement: A New
Look at the Role of the Lawyer, 76 TEX. L. REV. 77, 120 (1997) (using a psychology
experiment to support this conclusion). That said, the presence of a contingency fee
arrangement on the	
   plaintiffs’	
   side	
   can	
   actually	
   accentuate	
   these	
   risk	
   preferences	
   by	
  
enabling the lawyer herself to be more risk-seeking on a specific case among a larger
portfolio of cases. See Stephen C. Yeazell, Refinancing Civil Litigation, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 183,
200 (2001) (explaining that law firms give attorneys the flexibility to pursue a combination
of both high-payout, high-risk cases and low-risk, stable-payout cases); see also Jane
Goodman-Delahunty et al., Insightful	
  or	
  Wishful:	
  Lawyers’	
  Ability	
  To	
  Predict	
  Case Outcomes,
16 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 143 (2010) (finding that a majority of lawyers are
susceptible to overconfidence).
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judgment trilogy,91 and they have additional, though less explicit,
explanatory power in Twombly. Such concerns also underlie recent
court of appeals decisions requiring a putative class to satisfy the
requirements for class certification under Rule 23 by a preponderance
of the evidence, even if such an inquiry overlaps with merits-related
questions.92 However, with perhaps the limited exception of the
emerging trend toward more robust merits-based analysis at the class
certification stage, pretrial screening mechanisms like the summary
judgment stage and the motion to dismiss stage only eliminate
upward-shifting variance by screening out clearly meritless cases.
These binary mechanisms are not designed to narrow the potential
range of outcomes on surviving claims. Nor are they designed to
provide robust merits-based information about those claims, much less
at early stages in the litigation, when parties typically seek to manage
variance.93
High levels of variance can also, indirectly, incentivize defendants
to	
   make	
   strategic	
   “zero”	
   settlement	
   offers,94 perhaps in combination
with other strategic behavior vis-à-vis current procedural rules, in
order to shift settlement ranges downward for reasons bearing little
relationship to the merits. Of course, defendants may make zero offers
for a number of reasons.95 But in the face of potentially expansive
liability, say, in cases of mass harm or in cases involving high potential
91 See Nagareda, supra note	
  22,	
  at	
  651	
  (“Viewed	
  with	
  the	
  aid	
  of	
  our	
  scholarly	
  v ocabulary
today, the debates over the various pretrial checkpoints [such as summary judgment]
center on what one might label as uncertainty costs [like] variance of outcomes associated
with movement to successive stages of the litigation process.”).
92 See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 320, 324 (3d Cir. 2008)
(“An	
   overlap	
   between	
   a	
   class	
   certification	
   requirement	
   and	
   the	
   merits	
   of	
   a	
   claim	
   is	
   no	
  
reason to decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class
certification	
   requirement	
   is	
   met.”);	
   In re Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 37 (2d Cir.
2006) (establishing a preponderance of the evidence standard for class certification).
93 Parties tend to manage variance in lawsuits, as they do in finance, ex ante. Rhee, The
Effect of Risk, supra note 86, at 230 (explaining that parties, by necessity, make decisions ex
ante).
94 Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra note 59, at 343 (explaining that a zero
settlement offer is one in which the defendants refuse to make any settlement offer).
95 For instance, zero offers may be attributable to problems of litigation costs and
informational asymmetries; a defendant may make such offers in order to proceed to trial,
where she seeks vindication. See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV.
519, 591–92 (1997) [hereinafter Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits] (discussing impediments
to settlement of litigation over penalties for frivolous suits). An insured defendant, who
faces little risk as a practical matter of paying more than its insurance policy limit, may
rationally	
   make	
  a	
   zero	
  offer	
  simply	
   to	
   drive	
   down	
   the	
   payout	
   in	
   light	
   of	
   plaintiffs’	
   particular	
  
levels of risk tolerance and resources. See, e.g., Charles Silver et al., Physicians Insurance
Limits and Malpractice Payments: Evidence from Texas Closed Claims, 1990–2003, 36 J. LEGAL
STUD. S9, S10 (2007) (finding that only 1.5% of paid malpractice claims involved payments
that exceeded the primary policy limits).
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damages, defendants may react not by offloading the risk of variance
through settlement, but by making zero offers96 for strategic reasons.97
In particular, defendants facing multiple claims for similar harms may
exploit	
   plaintiffs’	
   risk	
   aversions,	
   which	
   are	
   especially pronounced for
those plaintiffs with limited resources, by taking a hard-line approach
to settlement.98 Such offers might even be conceptualized as a form of
vigilante procedural reform: To the extent pretrial procedural
mechanisms insufficiently inform parties about the merits of the
underlying claims so as to better narrow the range of potential
outcomes, zero offers can be conceptualized as a market response—
albeit a normatively undesirable one in cases in which claims are in
fact meritorious.
2.

Faint Shadows: Pretrial Procedures Fail To Provide Parties with
Robust Merits-Related Guidance for Settlement

Settlement outcomes that do not meaningfully reflect the merits of
the underlying claims are not just the product of factors that are
unrelated to the merits of a case and insufficiently mitigated by the
Federal Rules. Here I argue that they are also the product of at least
three structural features of the Federal Rules themselves. First, pretrial
adjudicative determinations under the Federal Rules, by design,
produce limited merits-based guidance for settlement decisions.
Second, more robust merits-based determinations are deferred until or
around the time of trial itself. Third, even those pretrial procedures
that provide limited merits-based guidance sometimes fail on their
own terms. Each of these structural features contributes to the fading
influence of substantive law on settlement outcomes.

96 Zero offers are not as rare as early litigation models, such as the Priest-Klein
hypothesis, would predict; in 1991, they were found to occur in 25.2% of personal injury
cases and in 44% of commercial transaction cases. Gross & Syverud, Getting to No, supra
note 59, at 343.
97 See id. at 343 (noting that zero offers are used for the strategic purposes of inducing
dismissal through threatened higher trial costs, dissuading risk-averse plaintiffs from
proceeding further with litigation, and discouraging future litigation by different plaintiffs).
98 This was the strategy that Merck employed at the outset of suits brought by various
plaintiffs alleging that its drug Vioxx caused heart attacks and strokes. See generally Howard
M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 270–71
& n.12 (2011) (noting that Merck initially insisted that it would take each and every case to
trial,	
  but	
  also	
  speculating	
  that	
  “early	
  trials	
  and	
  procedural	
  battles	
  may	
  be	
  seen	
  as	
  fights	
  over	
  
bargaining position for the all-but-inevitable	
   mass	
   settlement”).	
   Merck	
   then	
   took various
cases to trial, using the results as guideposts for a global settlement of Vioxx claims. See
generally id. at 278–80 (describing how the 2007 Vioxx settlement was reached).
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a. Pretrial Adjudicative Procedures Generate Limited Merits
Guidance
Pretrial adjudicative procedures are designed to determine
whether claims satisfy a minimum standard of viability sufficient to
allow them to move onto the next stage of the litigation. The 1938
reformers designed these mechanisms with the purpose of preventing
the expenditure of resources—by litigants or the judicial system—on
claims that were so insupportable as not to justify the cost of discovery
(motions to dismiss) or trial (summary judgment). This approach
makes sense from within the 1938 worldview: When the structural
litigation endpoint is resolution through trial, it is sensible for pretrial
adjudicative procedures to serve a gatekeeping function in
determining whether a given claim should, in fact, proceed to the next
step on the path toward trial. Moreover, by design, judges are limited
under these rules in their ability to apply law to facts.99 Pretrial
adjudicative mechanisms are not designed to give parties guidance,
particularly on issues that may be more salient to settlement decisions,
and in practice provide only weak signals as to whether the claim is
meritorious.100
The limitations of current pretrial adjudicative mechanisms to
provide merits-based guidance for settlement can be illustrated by an
example: the measure of damages, which clearly has a significant
influence on settlement outcomes. The fact that courts are limited to
adjudicating the merits of cases in the context of case-dispositive
motions at the pretrial stage typically will prevent courts from focusing
on legal issues that exert significant influence on settlement decisions
but will not resolve the entire dispute. Thus, to the extent the parties
disagree on the appropriate legal measure of damages, that issue likely
will not be addressed by the court until or just before trial—for
example, in resolving a motion in limine to exclude an expert witness
or	
   in	
   resolving	
   the	
   parties’	
   dispute	
   over	
   proposed	
   jury	
   instructions.	
  
Moreover, to the extent the parties disagree factually on the amount of
damages,	
   limitations	
   on	
   courts’	
   ability	
   to	
   resolve	
   factual	
   disputes	
   at	
   an	
  
99 That said, scholars have noted that the bright line between questions of law and fact
under the Federal Rules is fading. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v. Twombly: How
Motions to Dismiss Become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, 25 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 61, 72
(2007)	
   (pointing	
   out	
  that	
   the	
   “rigid	
   division	
   between fact and law that [appears] to be built
into	
  the	
  Federal	
  Rules”	
  has	
  long	
  been	
  eroding).	
  
100 See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, How Changes in the Legal Profession Reflect Changes in
Civil Procedure, 84 VA. L. REV. 955, 988–94 (1998) [hereinafter Molot, Changes in the Legal
Profession] (arguing that issue-narrowing is inadequately addressed through summary
judgment due to evolving summary judgment standards and institutional obstacles in
sifting through issues within a case).
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early stage hamper their ability to provide the parties with guidance
on that settlement-salient but non-dispositive issue.
For claims that are not so weak as to be screened out of the
system, current pretrial adjudication mechanisms fail to provide
meaningful merits-based guidance, instead serving as procedural
obstacles	
  that,	
  once	
  overcome,	
  increase	
  the	
  parties’	
  settlement	
  ranges.	
  
For instance, if a claim survives a summary judgment motion or a
motion to dismiss, both parties will raise settlement estimations.101 Or
at	
   the	
   very	
   least,	
   the	
   nonmovant’s	
   settlement	
   demands	
   will	
   increase	
  
following such denials, particularly given the psychological tendency of
litigants to try and recoup sunk costs.102 However, these procedures
are not designed to distinguish those claims that the nonmovant
maintains because of their strength on the merits and those it
maintains because they are just strong enough to pass through the
relevant procedural tollbooth.103 In short, allowing a claim to proceed
beyond the motion to dismiss or summary judgment stage shifts the
existing settlement range upward but does little to inform the width of
that settlement range.
b. Robust Merits Evaluation Occurs Too Late in the Litigation
Process To Influence Settlement Outcomes
Many of the mechanisms designed to generate meaningful merits
evaluation	
  often	
  arrive	
  too	
  late	
  to	
  enrich	
  the	
  parties’	
  understanding	
  of	
  
the strength of their claims before the case settles. For example, no
procedural checkpoint in the Federal Rules situated prior to trial, save
perhaps an emerging preponderance-of-the-evidence requirement at
the class certification stage,104 permits evaluation of evidence. In fact,
101 This will be true more often, in the case of summary judgment, if any impending trial
is to be conducted by a judge rather than a jury. Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 31, at
99 n.116. It will be less true, either for summary judgment or a motion to dismiss, if the
judge’s	
  denial	
  of a motion signals a likelihood of the movant on various upcoming motions
in either the discovery or trial stage of litigation. These signals may become more frequent,
and perhaps stronger, in the wake of 2010 amendments to Rule 56, which require judges to
explain a denial of a motion for summary judgment. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
102 The	
   “sunk	
   cost”	
   fallacy	
   is	
   a	
   psychological	
   phenomenon	
   whereby	
   individuals incur
further losses and/or take substantial risks in order to recoup prior losses. See, e.g., Hersh
Shefrin & Meir Statman, The Disposition To Sell Winners Too Early and Ride Losers Too Long:
Theory and Evidence, 40 J. FIN. 777, 789–90	
  (1985)	
  (describing	
  “sunk	
  costs”	
  in	
  the	
  context	
  of	
  
stock and mutual fund sale decisions).
103 See Molot, Changes in the Legal Profession, supra note 100, at 992 (discussing, in
particular, summary judgment).
104 See, e.g., Wal-Mart	
  Stores,	
  Inc.	
  v.	
  Dukes,	
  131	
  S.	
  Ct.	
  2541,	
  2551	
  (2011)	
  (“Rule	
  23	
  does	
  
not set forth a mere pleading standard. A party seeking class certification must affirmatively
demonstrate his compliance with the Rule—that is, he must be prepared to prove that there
are in fact sufficiently	
  numerous	
  parties,	
  common	
  questions	
  of	
  law	
  or	
  fact,	
  etc.”).
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the summary judgment standard explicitly prohibits such tasks.105 And
the most notable mechanism designed in part to provide such
information, the summary jury trial,106 has largely disappeared—in
part because it was unavailable until too late in the litigation
process.107
Consequently, unless parties proceed to trial—a rare, aberrant
choice—evidence in a given case tends to be evaluated in light of the
substantive law by no one other than the parties themselves. But
parties do so often in the face of legal uncertainty108 and under
conditions that tend to produce self-serving and frequently disparate
assessments of the relevant evidence and law.109 Further, even
information regarding the viability of claims for a possible trial is often
generated	
   too	
   late	
   in	
   the	
   litigation	
   process	
   to	
   inform	
   the	
   parties’	
  
settlement decisions. Summary judgment resolves very few cases,110
and the summary judgment mechanism comes only after the costs of
discovery have exerted settlement pressure.
c. Pretrial Merits-Screening Procedures Sometimes Fail on
Their Own Terms
In some instances, pretrial screening mechanisms fail even to

105 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (“Credibility	
  
determinations, the weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from
the facts are jury functions, not those of a judge, whether he is ruling on a motion for
summary	
  judgment	
  or	
  for	
  a	
  directed	
  verdict.”).	
  
106 See, e.g., Harvey G. Brown, The Summary Jury Trial: Perspectives of Bench and Bar, 38
HOUS. LAW. 32, 33 (2001) (describing the summary jury trial as a mock trial with a real judge
and jury but with a non-binding verdict). Critics, most prominently Judge Posner, have also
argued	
   for	
   “hesitation”	
   in	
   the	
   use	
   of	
   summary	
   jury	
   trials	
   that	
   enlarge	
   jury	
   service.	
   See
Richard A. Posner, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative Dispute
Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 386 (1986).
107 The	
   summary	
   jury	
   trial	
   is	
   “employed	
   as	
   a	
   ‘last	
   resort’	
   [and]	
   most	
   effectively	
  
conducted on the eve of trial after discovery is completed, litigation strategy is fully
developed,	
   and	
   other	
   settlement	
   attempts	
   have	
   failed.”	
  See Brown, supra note 106, at 33. Of
course, lawyers can and do conduct	
  “mock	
  jury”	
  trials,	
  but	
  they	
  tend	
  to	
  do	
  so	
  just	
  before	
  a	
  
case would go to trial.
108 See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Legal	
   Culture,	
   Legal	
   Strategy,	
   and	
   the	
   Law	
   in	
   Lawyers’	
  
Heads, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1498, 1555 (1996) (describing	
   the	
   dissonance	
   between	
   “law	
   on	
   the	
  
books”	
  and	
  the	
  more	
  simplified	
  and	
  highly	
  s ocialized	
  “law	
  in	
  lawyers’	
  heads”).	
  
109 While some behavioral studies indicate that attorneys may be less susceptible to selfserving biases than litigants, see for example Korobkin & Guthrie, supra note 90, at 137,
recent studies demonstrate that attorneys are not as adept at producing objective
assessments about the strength of their cases as believed, even when various debiasing
techniques are employed. See, e.g., Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 90, at 135–50
(finding that lawyers are susceptible to overconfidence).
110 The summary judgment mechanism is invoked in a fairly small percentage of cases.
See Cecil et al., supra note 31, at 871 (finding that in roughly twelve percent of cases, at least
one summary judgment motion is filed).
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generate limited signals about the merits of a case. This is because the
screening standards are very general and highly discretionary, and in
some jurisdictions or for some types of claims, trends in favor of either
granting or denying these pretrial dispositive motions have
emerged.111 Predictable outcomes weaken even the faint signals
generated by these pretrial adjudications for purposes of informing
settlement valuation. This is true in the following, albeit reductionist,
sense: To the extent settlement values reflect, however roughly, the
parties’	
  estimation	
  of	
  the	
  claimants’	
  likelihood	
  of	
  success	
  on	
  the	
  merits,	
  
p,112 a pronounced trend in favor either of granting (or denying)
summary judgment motions or motions to dismiss will decrease (or
increase) that value p by some percentage that is related not to the
merits, but instead to the trend itself.
For instance, trends in favor of denials can give claimants a
summary	
   judgment	
   or	
   a	
   motion	
   to	
   dismiss	
   “premium,”	
   prior	
   to	
   and	
  
with little consideration to the likelihood of success on those
motions.113 Conversely, when litigation takes place in jurisdictions or
before judges known for frequently granting such motions,114 the
strength of the limited merits-related signals is similarly weakened,
but settlement values will shift systematically downward, rather than
upward. Unless the party disadvantaged by the particular trend is
willing to gamble on an expensive, drawn-out, and uncertain appeal
(and the paucity of reported appellate opinions suggests that parties
may not typically be so able or inclined115), such predictability vitiates
the	
   credibility	
   of	
   that	
   party’s	
   threat	
   to	
   proceed	
   successfully	
   through	
  
pretrial adjudicatory stages.116
111 This reality is well understood among lawyers and has empirical support. See
Charlotte L. Lanvers, Different Federal District Court, Different Disposition: An Empirical
Comparison of ADA, Title VII Race and Sex, and ADEA Employment Discrimination Dispositions
in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania and the Northern District of Georgia, 16 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y 381,	
  382	
  (2007)	
  (citing	
  empirical	
  evidence	
  demonstrating	
  “[d]ifferences in case
dispositions	
  [that]	
  appear	
  to	
  depend	
  on	
  the	
  district	
  court	
  studied”).	
  
112 For a more in-depth discussion of the standard economic model used to analyze
settlement negotiations, see Rhee, The Effect of Risk, supra note 86, at 201.
113 See Robert G. Bone, Who Decides? A Critical Look at Procedural Discretion, 28 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1961, 1980 (2007) [hereinafter Bone, Who Decides?] (noting that when judges have a
reputation for frequently denying motions for summary judgment, parties will internalize
that fact long before the summary judgment stage).
114 See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 6, at 889–90 (noting that judges may
over screen cases at the motion to dismiss stage because of docket pressures).
115 See Edward Brunet, Six Summary Judgment Safeguards, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1165, 1183
(2010)	
   (“Modest	
   quantities	
   of	
   summary	
   judgment	
   appeals	
   suggest that the reported case
law	
  fails	
  to	
  reflect	
  a	
  representative	
  set	
  of	
  issues.”).
116 See Grundfest & Huang, supra note 55, at 1272–80 (describing the effect of
predictability	
   and	
   uncertainty	
   regarding	
   likely	
   case	
   outcomes	
   on	
   parties’	
   negotiating
positions).
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Further, trends in favor of granting pretrial motions transform
what might be acceptable transaction costs—acceptable in the sense
that they are directed at generating merits-based information about
the case—into costs that simply chill otherwise meritorious claims.
What	
   is	
   troubling,	
   from	
   a	
   policy	
   perspective,	
   is	
   not	
   just	
   the	
   trend’s	
  
shifting of settlement values downward, but also its shifting of claims
out of the federal courts completely, which will be more pronounced in
areas of the law characterized by typically under-capitalized plaintiffs
on the one hand, and repeat-player defendants, motivated to expend
resources on that motion disproportionate to the stakes of the case,117
on the other.
Predictable trends in the granting or denying of pretrial motions
have also emerged with regard to specific types of claims, again with
the effect of skewing settlement values in correspondence with those
categorical tendencies. For instance, some claims are known for being
treated	
  with	
  “kid	
  gloves”	
   for	
  purposes	
  of	
  summary	
   judgment,	
   meaning	
  
that a denial of summary judgment is more likely than it would be in
cases involving different types of claims.118 Such trends increase the
nonmovant’s	
   credibility	
   to	
   succeed	
   on	
   such	
   a	
   motion	
   without	
   a	
  
corresponding evaluation of the merits of a particular case, thus
shifting systematically settlement ranges attendant to those types of
claims upward.119 Moreover, if a judge, contrary to that general trend,
grants in part the motion for summary judgment, the settlement value
of the surviving claims will likely plummet to some degree more
significantly than it otherwise would in a jurisdiction not characterized
by such a trend because of the merits-based signal. Conversely,
empirical studies reveal that for other types of claims—particularly,
for instance, employment discrimination and civil rights claims—
summary judgments and motions to dismiss are disproportionately
granted.120 The effect of such trends will be to shift settlement ranges
117 See Issacharoff & Loewenstein, supra note 31, at 109–10 (describing how repeatdefenders can dissuade future suits by establishing threat credibility through costly pretrial
motions in all cases, even when the stakes in particular cases do not warrant them).
118 Such trends have emerged, for example, in the context of the Federal Employers
Liability Act (FELA). See, e.g., Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 506 (1957) (noting that,
under	
   the	
   FELA,	
   “the	
   test	
   of	
   a	
   jury	
   case	
   is	
   simply whether the proofs justify with reason the
conclusion that employer negligence played any part, even the slightest, in producing the
injury”).
119 See, e.g., Lanvers, supra note 111, at 398–99 (finding that local preferences for
summary judgment impact settlement decisions more than changes to the substantive law
do).
120 See, e.g., Raymond H. Brescia, The Iqbal Effect: The Impact of New Pleading Standards
in Employment and Housing Discrimination Litigation, 100 KY. L.J. 235, 239–40 (2011)
(reporting that post-Iqbal, employment and housing discrimination claims are being
dismissed at accelerated rates); Patricia W. Hatamyar, The Tao of Pleading: Do Twombly and
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systematically downward in line with the relevant trend, rather than
with the merits of a given case. Such effects, troublingly though
unsurprisingly, will be more pronounced the more impecunious the
claimants.
d. Scarce Trials and Current Pretrial Managerial Judging
Practices Do Not Cure These Problems
In a world in which the Rules of Civil Procedure that actually
generate merits-based guidance often boil down to Rules 12 and 56, a
distorted settlement market has emerged. Moreover, two features of
the procedural regime to which we might look to right the ship—the
few trials that remain and managerial judging through settlement
conferences under Rule 16—do not show sufficient promise to remedy
these problems. Indeed, they may only further steer the ship off course.
As for trials, the vanishing rate of trials means that trial outcomes
may not generate sufficient signals to create a well-functioning
settlement market. Moreover, empirical research reveals that even
those cases that do reach trial tend to be unrepresentative.121 Thus, to
the extent the outcomes of these cases succeed in helping to define the
settlement market by guiding settlement values, their outcomes may
actually distort those values in more typical cases.
Moreover, although the modern interpretation of Rule 16 evinces
a greater attentiveness by rulemakers to the fact that settlement is the
endpoint in most cases,122 empirical research also reveals that the
presentation to the parties of the legal strengths and weaknesses of a
Iqbal Matter Empirically?, 59 AM. U. L. REV. 553, 606 (2010) (finding that constitutional civil
rights cases and various labor cases are now more likely to be dismissed by a 12(b)(6)
motion than contracts, torts, and other types of cases); Theodore Eisenberg & Charlotte
Lanvers, Summary Judgment Rates over Time, Across Case Categories, and Across Districts: An
Empirical Study of Three Large Federal Districts 7–8 (Cornell Law Sch. Research Paper,
Paper No. 08-222, 2008), available at http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/lsrp_papers/108
(finding that employment discrimination and civil rights claims were dismissed on
summary judgment far more frequently than contract and tort claims); Memorandum from
Joe Cecil and George Cort, Fed. Judicial Ctr., to Judge Michael Baylson 3, 8–9 (Aug. 13, 2008),
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/sujulrs2.pdf (making similar
findings).
121 See Gross & Syverud, Don’t	
  Try, supra note 24, at 4, 6 (finding that the cases that go to
trial generally involve a combination of contingent fee arrangements, extensive insurance
policies that cover the cost of defending all or some of the potential damages, personal
injury claims, and particularly odd facts); Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality:
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359,
1395–96, 1399 (noting that claimants who take cases to trial may be unusually interested in
obtaining formalized justice).
122 See generally David L. Shapiro, Federal Rule 16: A Look at the Theory and Practice of
Rulemaking, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1969,	
   1984	
   (1989)	
   (“The	
   role	
   of	
   the	
   judge	
   .	
   .	
   .	
   was	
   to	
   keep	
  
cases moving at a reasonable pace, and to see that cases not be needlessly	
  tried.”).
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given case—long thought to be the hallmark of settlement
conferences—plays a surprisingly small role in the sorts of settlement
conferences for which Rule 16 calls.123 Nonetheless, judges report that
they exert heavy pressure on parties to settle—influence that appears
to be motivated by factors unrelated to the merits of the case,
including, primarily, the belief that settlement generally is in the
parties’	
   best	
   interests;	
   secondarily,	
   a	
   sense	
   of	
   accomplishment at
having settled a case; and thirdly, to some degree, the desire to clear
dockets.124
Of course, the introduction of more systematic guidelines for
discussing the merits during settlement conferences might improve
matters on this score. That said, even if managerial judging techniques
under Rule 16 were harnessed for the express purpose of injecting a
discussion of the merits into settlement negotiations, such techniques
would still occur in a highly discretionary and nontransparent
manner.125 Moreover, judges are poorly situated, as an institutional
matter, to bring about systematic changes along these lines.126 Indeed,
and	
   particularly	
   to	
   the	
   extent	
   that	
   injecting	
   the	
   merits	
   into	
   parties’	
  
settlement calculations may call for different procedural rules in
different contexts,127 such policy-laden decisions are best made
systematically, by the Rules Advisory Committee or Congress, rather
than through ad hoc and nontransparent managerial judging.
In sum, the state of the world of settlement under our current
123 See Robinson, supra note 39, at 126 (reporting that only twenty-three percent of
general	
  jurisdiction	
  judges	
  claimed	
  that	
  they	
  used	
  this	
  “technique”	
  in	
  ninety	
  percent	
  of	
  their	
  
settlement conferences and that twenty percent of judges reported using it in less than forty
percent of their conferences; reporting also that among judges who settle a proportionately
higher number of their cases, about a fifth report using this technique more than ninety
percent of the time and an approximately equal number report using it less than ten percent
of the time). To be clear, Robinson surveyed state judges, not federal judges. Id. at 114–15.
Further empirical work regarding various approaches federal court judges apply in
settlement conferences is needed. However, the information about state court judges is
consistent with the focus of procedural and legislative reforms regarding settlement of
federal cases, which have focused on bringing about settlement quickly.
124 See Robinson, supra note 39, at 143–46	
  (reporting	
  that	
  judges’	
  biggest	
  motivation for
influencing parties	
   to	
   settle	
   is	
   that	
   they	
   believe	
   that	
   settlement	
   is	
   in	
   the	
   parties’	
   best	
  
interests; that roughly seventy-five percent of all judges are also motivated by a desire to
settle hard cases; and that roughly thirty-three percent of general civil judges (as opposed
to family law judges) are motivated by a desire to clear crowded dockets in more than half
of their cases).
125 See, e.g., Molot, An Old Judicial Role, supra note 43, at 40–41 (noting that managerial
judging is not uniform); Resnik, supra note 37, at	
  378	
  (“Managerial	
  judges	
  frequently	
  work	
  
beyond the public view, off the record, with no obligation to provide written, reasoned
opinions,	
  and	
  out	
  of	
  reach	
  of	
  appellate	
  review.”).
126 See generally Molot, An Old Judicial Role, supra note 43, at 41–43 (noting that
managerial	
  judging	
  departs	
  from	
  the	
  “traditional”	
  role	
  of	
  the	
  judge).
127 See infra Part III.A.3.
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procedural regime should give us pause about the extent to which our
procedural rules are providing parties with meaningful merits-based
information for purposes of guiding settlement decisions. Indeed, there
is reason to suspect that settlement negotiations carried out under the
current Federal Rules and purportedly conducted in the shadow of the
governing law may not be meaningfully influenced by that law. And, as
the next subpart will show, the situation could be getting worse: As the
shadow that laws cast over case outcomes is growing faint, a new
shadow—the shadow of settlement—is emerging.
B.

Eclipsing the Shadow of the Law: Settlements in the Shadow of
Settlement

A different reality of modern litigation threatens to distort
settlement outcomes even further. Increasingly, without trial outcomes
to guide settlements, parties look to outcomes of prior settlements to
guide their judgments about settlement values. This trend of
bargaining in the shadow of settlement has only begun to receive
attention in the empirical literature. But the trend is an important
aspect of the problem facing modern litigation because it tends to
amplify the distortions of the settlement market outlined in Part II.A.
Prior settlement outcomes, which suffer from all of the distortions
detailed above, can now propagate those distortions insofar as they
influence future settlement outcomes.128
The notion that settlements cast a meaningful shadow on future
case outcomes runs contrary to the conventional account of settlement.
Judges, legislators, and scholars have long criticized settlement for its
secretive nature.129 Concerns	
   about	
   settlements’	
   secrecy,	
   and	
   more	
  
specifically,	
   parties’	
   ability	
   to	
   purchase	
   that	
  secrecy	
   at	
   the	
  expense	
  of	
  
the public, have led a number of federal district courts to restrict the
use of sealed settlement agreements.130 Scholars continue to debate
128 Indeed,	
   settlement	
   outcomes	
   may	
   even	
   influence	
   jurors’	
   perceptions	
   of	
   right	
   and	
  
wrong, and perhaps even their verdicts, as exemplified by the few remaining trials in our
modern world of litigation. See Depoorter, supra note 7, at 957, 978.
129 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 41, at 803 (noting that the rise of settlement and
alternative	
   dispute	
   resolution	
   has	
   reduced	
   the	
   impact	
   of	
   the	
   “public	
   processes	
   of	
   courts,”	
  
which	
   “contribute	
   to	
   the	
   functioning	
   of	
   democracies	
   and	
   give	
   meaning	
   to	
   democratic	
  
precepts that locate sovereignty in the people, constrain government actors, and insist on
the	
  equality	
  of	
  treatment	
  under	
  law”);	
  Fromm,	
   supra note 42, at 663	
  (“[M]ost	
  information	
  
about settlement remains hidden behind confidentiality agreements and sealed court
records.”);	
   Gross	
   &	
   Syverud,	
   Don’t	
   Try, supra note 24, at 4 (describing settlements as
“invisible”).	
   Perhaps the most famous critique of settlement, set forth by Owen Fiss,
laments, among other things, that settlement fails to produce public pronouncements of the
law. See Fiss, supra note 5, at 1089–90.
130 For example, the U.S. District Court for the District of South Carolina prohibits the
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whether such reforms are desirable,131 particularly in specific
categories of cases that may warrant some measure of courtsanctioned secrecy.132 Whatever	
  one’s	
  normative	
   view, as a descriptive
matter, settlement literature largely accepts that information related to
a particular settlement remains in the hands of the parties to the
dispute.133
As an empirical matter, however, secret settlements may not be as
pervasive as is commonly thought. For instance, a 2010 study reveals
that information about settlements is in fact available to legal
professionals through a variety of means: sunshine laws; the oral
culture of legal communities, enhanced both by increased judicial
involvement in promoting settlements and the rise of large law firms,
wherein a great deal of sensitive information is shared among large
numbers of attorneys; specialized law reporters, which provide
settlement information related to certain injuries, jurisdictions, legal
fields, or areas of practice; professional interest organizations, such as
filing of settlements under seal, D.S.C. LOCAL CIV. R. 5.03(E), and the Eastern District of
Michigan has adopted a local rule limiting the duration of secret settlement agreements, E.D.
MICH. LOCAL R. 5.3. For a survey of federal court local rules addressing sealed records, see
ROBERT TIMOTHY REAGAN ET AL., FED. JUDICIAL CTR., SEALED SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN FEDERAL
DISTRICT
COURT
app.
at
B-1
to
-27
(2004),
available
at
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/sealset3.pdf/$file/sealset3.pdf.
131 Compare, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions
and Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1480–82 (2006) (arguing that
sunshine laws and other similar reforms may lead to forum shopping or cause parties to
leave the system of litigation altogether), with David A. Dana & Susan P. Koniak, Secret
Settlements and Practice Restrictions Aid Lawyer Cartels and Cause Other Harms, 2003 U. ILL.
L. REV. 1217,	
   1226	
   (“[T]here	
   are	
   no	
   legitimate	
   interests	
   protected	
   by	
   ‘private’	
   secrecy	
  
agreements	
  that	
  could	
  not	
  be	
  as	
  well	
  protected	
  by	
  court	
  orders	
  where	
  appropriate.”).
132 See Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and Party Agreements, 9
J.L. & POL’Y 67,	
   98	
   (2000)	
   (suggesting	
   a	
   “presumption	
   of	
   nondisclosure”	
   when	
   courts
consider	
   materials	
   that	
   “have	
   not	
   been	
   used	
   at	
   trial	
   or	
   on	
   motion	
   to	
   obtain	
   a	
   substantive	
  
decision,”	
   but	
   suggesting	
   that	
   the	
   opposite	
   presumption	
   be	
   applied	
   when	
   cases	
   involve	
   “the	
  
propriety	
   of	
   the	
   actions	
   of	
   a	
   government	
   entity”	
   or	
   when	
   the	
   materials	
   involved	
   “have	
   been	
  
presented at trial . . .	
   in	
   support	
   of	
   a	
   substantive	
   determination”);	
   Arthur	
   R.	
   Miller,	
  
Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427, 485–
86 (1991) [hereinafter Miller, Confidentiality] (noting that	
  “public	
  access	
  may	
  be	
  important	
  
when one of the settling litigants is a governmental agency, public entity, or official, when
the settlement is a court-approved class settlement, or when there has been some other
significant judicial participation in the	
  process,”	
  but	
  concluding	
  that	
  in	
  most	
  cases,	
  “absent	
  
special circumstances, a court should honor confidentialities that are bargained-for
elements	
  of	
  settlement	
  agreements”).
133 See, e.g., Jules Coleman & Charles Silver, Justice in Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 102,
114–15 (1986) (noting that settlement deprives the public of information with regard to the
state of the law in the form of judicial opinions and precedents); Friedenthal, supra note
132, at 76–77 (noting that parties can conclude private confidentiality agreements or seek
protective orders from the court to guarantee the confidentiality of information); Miller,
Confidentiality, supra note 132, at 486–87 (describing the use of confidentiality orders in
settlements).
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the American Association for Justice; and, less reliably as a matter of
representative sampling, mass media coverage.134 According to this
study,	
  “lawyers	
  are	
  generally	
  aware of the trends in settlement awards
in	
   their	
   field	
   of	
   practice”135 and judges are likely aware of settlement
trends within their districts.136 Further, a 2004 FJC study, the most
systematic conducted to date, revealed that only 0.44% of 288,846 civil
cases resulted in sealed settlements.137 The FJC also found that in
ninety-seven percent of the cases with sealed settlement agreements,
the complaint was not sealed.138
Of course, settlement is by no means a fully transparent process.
Many settlement outcomes remain confidential, particularly in cases
involving personal injury claims.139 Attorneys still attest anecdotally to
the use of confidentiality agreements.140 Empirical data, particularly
regarding the extent to which disputes are settled before cases are
filed in court, remains incomplete.141 Further, the sources of settlement
information are more available to certain parties than to others,142 and
even where some settlement information is available, there is often
more information that remains unavailable to the public.143
134

Depoorter, supra note 7, at 966–70.
Id. at 971 n.56.
136 See id. at 973 (noting that a majority of lawyers surveyed believed judges to have
such an awareness).
137 REAGAN ET AL., supra note 130, at 3, 5. Nevertheless, additional empirical work on this
score is needed. The Federal Judiciary Center (FJC) study, though the most systematic study
of settlement confidentiality conducted to date, does not evaluate the percentage of
Stipulated Motions of Dismissal, which effectively can conceal settlements from the public
eye.
138 Id. at 8.
139 See id. at 3, 5 (noting that of the 1270 cases with sealed settlements evaluated by the
FJC, thirty percent were personal injury cases).
140 See, e.g., Fromm, supra note 42, at 676	
  (reporting	
  one	
  defense	
  lawyer’s	
  statement that
“[he	
   had never] put a settlement together in the past five to six years that [has not
contained]	
  a	
  confidentiality	
  clause”);	
  id. at 676 n.53 (reporting the statement of a labor and
employment	
   lawyer,	
   who	
   “never	
   settles	
   a	
   private,	
   single-person lawsuit without a
confidentiality	
  clause	
  in	
  the	
  settlement	
  agreement”).
141 As Chief Judge Joseph F. Anderson of the U.S. District Court for the District of South
Carolina	
   noted,	
   “I	
   will	
   concede	
   that	
   the	
   vast	
   majority	
   of	
   cases	
   are	
   settled	
   openly.	
   I	
   would	
  
also contend, however, that the number of sealed settlements is greater than the index
books	
   or	
   docket	
   sheets	
   would	
   suggest.”	
   Joseph	
   F.	
   Anderson,	
   Jr.,	
   Hidden from the Public by
Order of the Court: The Case Against Government-Enforced Secrecy, 55 S.C. L. REV. 711, 738
(2004).
142 See Fromm, supra note	
  42,	
  at	
  700	
  (“Because	
  some	
  sources	
  of	
  settlement	
  information
are better than others, and because the best source of settlement information—the
firsthand knowledge of the repeat player—is available to relatively few persons, each
participant in a dispute may have a different quantity and quality of settlement
information . . . .”).
143 See id. at	
   680	
   (“[Because]	
   so	
   many	
   settlements	
   are	
   confidential,	
   published	
   sources	
  
and networks are seriously deficient in the amount of settlement information they generate
135
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Nevertheless, the conventional view of settlements as wholly
secret obscures the ways in which publicly available information about
settlements	
   increasingly	
   impacts	
   parties’	
   settlement	
   decisions.	
   This	
  
trend	
   of	
   using	
   prior	
   settlement	
   outcomes	
   as	
   “precedent”	
   is	
   likely	
   to	
  
increase as interested parties turn to electronic databases to guide
settlement payouts. The insurance industry has taken the lead in
creating and using such databases to calculate settlement ranges144—
unsurprising, given the heavy influence of insurance coverage in the
resolution of disputes.145 The two most widely used programs are (1)
Colossus, which is employed primarily to determine settlement ranges
for personal injury claims by analyzing medical reports to determine
treatment options, pain and suffering, and impairment, and (2)
Xactimate, which operates much like Colossus, but which is used to
calculate settlement ranges in property damage claims.146
These settlement databases, at least in their current forms,
illustrate the potential problems that bargaining in the shadow of
settlement creates for aligning settlement outcomes with the merits of
underlying claims. First, settlement in the shadow of settlement
creates its own distortive informational imbalances. Whereas litigated
outcomes are publicly reported, and thus widely available, repeatplayer litigants, primarily insurers and their attorneys, have begun to
build up a virtual monopoly over the information about unreported
settlements. This informational monopoly gives those parties
bargaining advantages against less informed litigants, enabling the
shift of settlement values downward in favor of the insurer, but for
reasons bearing little relationship to the merits of the claims.147
Second, this informational imbalance allows the parties holding
and	
  are	
  often	
  unreliable	
  tools	
  for	
  case	
  evaluation	
  and	
  negotiation.”).
144 There are other electronic sources of settlement information; in particular, some of
this information can be found in judgment and verdict databases on legal research sites like
Westlaw and LexisNexis. The information in these databases, however, is scattered, limited,
and unsystematic.
145 See, e.g., Tom Baker, Blood Money, New Money, and the Moral Economy of Tort Law in
Action, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 275, 280 (2001) (finding a similar trend in personal injury
litigation); Baker & Griffith, supra note 53, at 806 (finding that the majority of securities
claims	
   settle	
   within	
   the	
   limits	
   of	
   the	
   defendants’	
   directors’	
   and	
   officers’	
   insurance	
  
coverage); Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L. REV. 1055, 1067 (2006)
(reporting similar trends).
146 Whitney R. Mauldin, Good Business/Bad Faith: Why the Insurance Industry Should
Adopt a Good Faith Model, 44 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 151, 153 (2008).
147 See, e.g., Galanter & Cahill, supra note 35, at 1386 (discussing the ways in which
“informational	
   disparities	
   are	
   accentuated”	
   by	
   confidential	
   settlements); Lauren K. Robel,
The Myth of Disposable Opinion: Unpublished Opinions and Government Litigants in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 87 MICH. L. REV. 940, 955 (1989) (arguing that repeat players with
first-hand knowledge of the content of unpublished opinions have informational advantages
that better position them to prepare their cases).
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the information to cherry-pick past precedents that favor them, and to
do so in ways that are not transparent to the informationally
disadvantaged party. The databases used by these software programs
for generating settlement valuations have been found to contain
selective past-claims-payment histories.148 Notably, they have also
been	
   found	
   to	
   exclude	
   as	
   anomalies	
   any	
   jury	
   verdicts	
   or	
   “high	
   end”	
  
settlement values—but they nevertheless often include zero
verdicts.149 As a result, critics have argued that these settlement
databases allow insurance companies to negotiate systematically
undervalued settlements.150
For these and other reasons, scholars have begun to call for the
systematic compilation of settlement information into publicly
available databases.151 Development and implementation of such
databases may well help diminish the informational advantages that
settlement in the shadow of settlement currently grants repeat players.
These databases could also add transparency to a settlement market
148 But see Dawn R. Bonnett, The Use of Colossus® To Measure the General Damages of a
Personal Injury Claim Demonstrates Good Faith Claims Handling, 53 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 107,
131–32 (2006) (defending the use of Colossus to determine settlement values on the
grounds that it provides for more consistent claims handling).
149 Robert D. Bennett, How To Deal with Colossus, in 2 ASS’N OF TRIAL LAWYERS OF AM.,
ATLA ANNUAL CONVENTION REFERENCE MATERIALS: MOTOR VEHICLE COLLISION, HIGHWAY, AND
PREMISES LIABILITY (2005); see also Dougherty v. AMCO Ins. Co., No. C 07-01140 MHP, 2008
WL	
   2563225,	
   at	
   *3	
   (N.D.	
  Cal.	
   June	
   23,	
   2008)	
   (“The	
  settlement	
   range	
   output	
   by	
   Colossus	
   was	
  
based solely on pre-litigation settlements . . . . Neither jury verdicts, arbitration awards nor
post-litigation settlements	
  were	
  reflected	
  in	
  the	
  Colossus	
  analysis	
  of	
  settlement	
  value.”).
150 See, e.g., David Dietz & Darrell Preston, Home	
   Insurers’	
   Secret	
   Tactics	
   Cheat	
   Fire	
  
Victims,
Hike
Profits,
BLOOMBERG.COM,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aIOpZROwhvNI
(last
visited Oct. 22, 2012) (describing settlement databases as part of a conscious plan by
insurers to underpay claimants). As just one example, the Wall Street Journal presented the
case of a seventeen-year-old who was severely injured in a car accident caused by a drunk
driver. See Jerry Guidera, “Colossus”	
  at	
  the	
  Accident	
  Scene:	
  Insurers	
  Use	
  a	
  Software	
  Program	
  
To	
   Pay	
   Out	
   Claims	
  for	
  Injuries,	
   but	
   Lawsuits	
   Claim	
   It’s	
   Misused, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2003, at C1.
Colossus generated a payout	
  of	
  $31,588;	
  the	
  girl’s	
  medical	
  bills	
  alone	
  were	
  over	
  $18,000.	
  Id.
She and her parents filed two separate suits against Allstate. Id. In the first suit, a Montana
jury found for Sullivan in the amount of $105,000; in the second suit, Allstate employees
testified that the Colossus database did not include jury verdicts—the company settled four
days into trial. Id.
151 For instance, Stephen Yeazell recently advocated for the creation of electronic
databases whereby basic information about settlements—including, for instance, the
amount of damages claimed, the place suit was filed, and the ultimate settlement amount—
would be compiled and made accessible online. See generally Steven C. Yeazell,
Transparency for Civil Settlements: NASDAQ for Lawsuits? (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law &
Economics Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 08-15, 2011), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1161343.	
  Similarly,	
  Nora	
  Engstrom	
  has	
  suggested	
  that	
  plaintiffs’	
  
attorneys who work on a contingency fee basis and seek damages in cases for personal
injury or wrongful death should be subject to public disclosure requirements. Nora
Freeman Engstrom, Sunlight and Settlement Mills, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 805, 866–68 (2011).
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that is still in many ways opaque152 and enable potential clients to
make more informed attorney-selection decisions.153 But such
correctives cannot cure the underlying problem that settlement
outcomes themselves remain the product of distortive forces that the
Federal Rules fail to mitigate, and in fact at times exacerbate. Thus,
there is significant reason to pause before we further catalyze, and
ultimately cement, the growing phenomenon of prior settlements
serving as precedent154 for the formulation of expected-settlementvalue estimations.
Indeed, the proliferation of settlement databases—if implemented
without sensitivity to the problems identified above and without the
initiation of reforms along the lines this Article suggests—would
simply bring about the pricing of substantive legal entitlements via the
compilation of a set of distorted data points. Accordingly, the emerging
problem	
   of	
   “precedent”	
   in	
   a	
   world	
   of	
   settlement	
   may	
   be	
   worse	
   than	
  
critics of settlement have feared: Perhaps the modern concern about
settlement is less that it fails to generate any public precedent and
more that it is producing an abundance of bad precedents that fail to
reflect in meaningful ways the dictates of the substantive law. In short,
settlement may be moving increasingly out of the shadow of the law
and	
   into	
   the	
   shadow	
   of	
   itself,	
   thereby	
   over	
   time	
   molding	
   “legal	
  
precedent,”	
  or	
  what	
  is	
  generally	
  thought	
  of	
  as	
  “law,”	
  in	
  its	
  own	
  image.
III
TOWARD THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT

The shift to a world of settlement calls for fundamental procedural
reform. As demonstrated in Part II, the current Rules fail to achieve a
foundational objective of our civil justice system in a world of
settlement: ensuring that case outcomes align with the merits of
underlying disputes. In light of that goal, this Part takes steps toward
the development of a new procedural regime for a world of settlement.
This Part begins by challenging three central assumptions of the
current Rules, all of which fail to meaningfully align settlement
152 See Yeazell, supra note	
   151,	
  at	
   2	
  (“[L]itigants	
  and	
   their	
   lawyers	
   price in the dark [and
engage] in transactions for civil claims in a state of ignorance we think intolerable in other
similarly	
  important	
  markets.”).
153 See Engstrom, supra note 151, at 868–71 (citing analogous examples of disclosure
use in medical markets and indicating that individuals in the legal market would make use
of disclosed information).
154 See Baker & Griffith, supra note 53, at 786 (stating that when lawyers talk about
“expected	
   trial-value,”	
   they	
   actually	
   mean	
   “[t]his	
   case	
   is	
   like	
   other	
   cases that we have
settled”);	
   Menkel-Meadow, supra note 30, at 2681 (pointing out that settlements are
affected by past settlements).
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outcomes with the merits of underlying disputes. In so doing, this Part
provides a framework for reform. Further, this Part addresses a
number of reform proposals by procedure scholars and resituates
them conceptually as challenges to these same three assumptions.
Viewing these proposals through the lens of the mismatch between the
current Rules and settlement offered in Part II, this Part argues that
these proposals ought to be refined and expanded to address the
specific distortions set forth in Part II, and to contribute to a more
systematic redesign of the basic model and operation of the Federal
Rules for a world of settlement. It then offers, as examples and for
further consideration, new suggestions of the kinds of reforms that
would break free from the core assumptions challenged here, and that
are directed expressly toward aligning settlement outcomes with the
merits of underlying disputes.
This Part concludes by presenting a new vision of the role of
procedure to succeed that of the 1938 reformers. Instead of merely
facilitating trial, pretrial procedures should be purposefully directed
toward more meaningfully aligning settlement outcomes with the
underlying merits. Pretrial procedure should be interdependent with
substantive merits adjudication, not merely antecedent to it. In offering
this new vision of our system of procedure,155 this Article lays the
conceptual groundwork for the Federal Rules of Civil Settlement.
A.

Redesigning Procedure for a World of Settlement by Reconsidering
Core Assumptions of the Federal Rules

The shortcomings of the existing procedural rules, given the
fundamental shift from a world of trials to a world of settlement, can
be traced to three foundational assumptions underlying the Federal
155 To emphasize the need to redesign the Federal Rules for a world of settlement is not
to take a position against the desirability of reforms that would move toward making trials
once again commonplace. See Owen M. Fiss, The History of an Idea, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1273,
1276	
   (2009)	
   (arguing	
   that	
   the	
   “strictures	
   of	
   public	
   reason”	
   imposed	
   by	
   adjudication—for
instance, the confronting of grievances by a judge, the hearing of those grievances from
affected parties, and the rendering of a decision based on principle—should be more
robustly effectuated in a world of modern litigation). It is rather to acknowledge modern
litigation realities and to adopt more modest ambitions for reform in the hope that such
reform will be more likely. Although procedure cannot fix everything and no system of
procedure will ever be perfect, the world of settlement demands better than our current
system provides.	
   To	
   be	
   sure,	
   trial	
   may	
   not	
   always	
   live	
   up	
   to	
   Fiss’s	
   ideals,	
   and	
   it	
   is	
  
conceivable that the process of settlement can be imbued with some of the elements and
values of trial. See Howard M. Erichson, Foreword: Reflections on the Adjudication-Settlement
Divide, 78 FORDHAM L. REV.	
   1117,	
   1127	
   (2009)	
   (“The	
   divide	
   between	
   adjudication	
   and	
  
settlement has become increasingly blurry . . . . [E]ven where adjudication and settlement
are neatly separable, the divide between them is not so stark as Fiss suggests in terms of the
values	
  they	
  serve.”).
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Rules of Civil Procedure. Those principles are first, that a regime of
plenary discovery will generate case outcomes that accurately reflect
the merits of underlying claims; second, that the role of pretrial
procedures should be limited to the weeding out of meritless cases;
and third, that the Federal Rules should apply generally to all types of
claims, and across all types of cases.
This section examines each of these outmoded assumptions. It
also argues that recent, isolated reform proposals can be better
understood as challenges to these assumptions, and therefore as
important starting points for addressing the deeper problem that the
model of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is ill suited for a world of
settlement. Given the problems discussed in Part II, this section
suggests ways to refine and expand these proposals. It also sets forth
additional reform proposals that break free of these foundational
assumptions and are expressly oriented toward aligning settlement
outcomes with the merits of underlying disputes.
1.

Rethinking the Assumption that Plenary Discovery Aligns Case
Outcomes with the Merits

The Federal Rules were premised on the notion that exhaustive
information exchange through a regime of plenary discovery would
facilitate the resolution of cases based upon the underlying merits. At
one level, this premise seems uncontroversial: A system that generates
more information would seem to lead to better results. And that logic
may have been vindicated in the relatively straightforward cases
typically brought in federal court in 1938.156 Some seventy years after
the drafting of those rules, however, the work of the federal courts
requires the resolution of far more complex claims arising under a
plethora of new substantive statutes, often alleging wrongdoing on a
national and even global scale.157 Many of the cases that exist today are
of a complexity and scope largely unimagined at the time of the Federal
Rules’	
  enactment.
In the context of modern litigation, the notion that more discovery
will always promote better merits-based resolution of claims needs to
be revisited. As a general matter, current discovery rules are aimed
almost exclusively at curing informational asymmetries, but they do so
156 See Resnik, supra note 27, at 512–13 (describing the assumption embedded in the
Federal Rules that private litigants engaged in monetary disputes would have the resources
to process a large volume of information).
157 See, e.g., Glover, supra note 23, at 1214 (citing variance between the United States and
Europe both in the nature of particular procedural rules and in levels of reliance upon
centralized regulation as factors inhibiting global-scale class actions).
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in a way that tends not to be sensitive to cost imposition, and they are
not deployed in a manner that tries to reduce variance.
More specifically, the problem with this principle in a world of
settlement has at least two dimensions. First, plenary discovery
permits the imposition of high absolute costs, and the desire to avoid
these costs drives settlement outcomes independent of the merits of
the underlying claims. Although discovery costs are normally
perceived as disadvantaging defendants, plenary discovery can often
disadvantage plaintiffs by permitting defendants to conceal critical
information through cost imposition.158
Second, in the context of complex, multi-faceted claims and issues,
plenary discovery has the potential to permit cost imposition without
producing, and indeed at the expense of, informational benefits on the
substantive issues that would otherwise primarily drive settlement
outcomes. Under the current Rules, cost imposition at the discovery
stage is justified by the goal of bringing to light information on all
claims for use at trial. The current Rules treat all claims and issues that
satisfy the gate-keeping standard provided in the motion to dismiss as
equal from the standpoint of discovery.159 However, in a world of
settlement, certain substantive issues—for instance, those tied to a
theory of liability that carries with it significant damages—predictably
will	
   exert	
   disproportionate	
   influence	
   on	
   parties’	
   settlement	
   decisions.	
  
Discovery on those issues would facilitate merits-based settlements
while discovery on other, more tangential issues may simply impose
additional absolute costs that add little information about the issues
that matter most to settlement values and also may delay (or prevent)
parties from unearthing facts relevant to those more critical claims.
Thus, in a world of settlement, discovery promotes settlement
outcomes that align with the merits to the extent that the cost
imposition associated with that discovery is justified by the
informational	
   benefits	
   of	
   that	
   discovery	
   to	
   the	
   parties’	
   settlement	
  
decisions,	
   as	
   opposed	
   to	
   the	
   benefits	
   that	
   inure	
   primarily	
   to	
   parties’	
  
trial preparations.
Recent discovery reform proposals, such as those suggesting more
formalized mechanisms of targeted discovery,160 can be understood
conceptually as raising a fundamental challenge to the viability of
plenary discovery for purposes of aligning settlement outcomes with

158

See supra Part II.A.1.a.
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).
160 The default of the Federal Rules is not to target discovery, but judges have authority
to do so. See FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(3)(B)(ii), 16(c)(2)(F), 26(b)(2)(C), 26(c) (detailing
methods by which judges may constrain the scope of discovery).
159
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the merits. For instance, scholars have suggested that issue-targeted
discovery is needed to address asymmetrical cost imposition
generated in the plenary discovery process.161 Specifically, it has been
proposed that soon after the complaint and answer have been filed, the
judge	
  (with	
  the	
  parties’	
  help)	
  should	
  identify	
  those	
  issues	
  that	
  will	
  be	
  
contested at summary judgment, and then allow discovery to be
performed only on them, leaving other potentially contestable issues—
like damages—for later discovery if the initial issues survive summary
judgment.162 And some district judges, especially in multi-district
litigation cases, have employed such techniques in the exercise of their
discretion,163 albeit not in uniform ways.
Targeted discovery along these lines could reduce the overall
costs of discovery164 by eliminating discovery on issues that might be
mooted by a successful motion for summary judgment. But these
proposals should be refined so that they seek not only to eliminate
potentially unnecessary costs but also to focus discovery efforts and
their attendant costs more purposefully on issues most crucial to the
parties’	
  settlement	
  decisions.
An example of a discovery reform that is sensitive to these
additional considerations would take the following form: For cases
with multiple claims, and potentially multi-faceted claims, a targeted
discovery regime would be designed such that those claims capable of
generating the most variance (for example, those involving statutory
damages multipliers or civil penalties) are investigated and resolved
first. This regime would thereby mitigate the effects of variance on
settlement decisions by narrowing the range of outcomes through the
development of merits-based information on those claims. Indeed, in
certain circumstances, targeted discovery on damages issues ought to
be conducted first, to the extent those issues exert the brunt of
influence	
   on	
   parties’	
   settlement	
   decisions.	
   Alternatively,	
   as	
   another	
  

161 See Molot, Changes in the Legal Profession, supra note 100, at 1043–45 (arguing for
targeted discovery as part of a package of reforms including strengthened summary
judgment and fee-shifting provisions); see also Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, supra note 95,
at 593–96 (arguing that judicial screening combined with targeted discovery is the best
method of controlling frivolous litigation).
162 Molot, Changes in the Legal Profession, supra note 100, at 1043–44.
163 See, e.g., Klein v. King, 132 F.R.D. 525 (N.D. Cal. 1990) (entering a court order for
targeted, phased, and sequenced discovery); MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) §
11.422 (2004) (endorsing targeted, phased, and sequenced discovery, but cautioning that
the court must be sensitive to the risk that such discovery will be inefficient).
164 See generally JAMES S. KAKALIK ET AL., RAND INST. FOR CIVIL JUSTICE, JUST, SPEEDY, AND
INEXPENSIVE: AN EVALUATION OF JUDICIAL CASE MANAGEMENT UNDER THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM
ACT 16 (1996) (finding that strict discovery cut-offs reduced time to disposition and
litigation costs).
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example, dispositive (or near-dispositive) issues regarding key
theories of liability would be investigated first, thus decreasing the
overall amount of discovery needed to reach a settlement that reflects
in substantial part the dictates of substantive law.165
A targeted discovery regime, properly designed for a world of
settlement, would also address another shortcoming of the current
system of plenary discovery—namely, the potential for defendants to
exploit informational advantages and impose significant costs through
voluminous production. Currently, plenary discovery invites full-scale
strategic warfare. This model of mutually assured destruction166
enables a great deal of cost imposition and can do more to obscure
than to illuminate facts ultimately bearing on the underlying merits of
the claims. Therefore, a redesigned discovery regime would seek to
reduce the volume of production generally as well as the search costs
associated with voluminous production, while also being sensitive to
the costs of production born by defendants.167 For example, Rule 34
ought possibly to be reformed to require defendants to organize
production by type and origin of material produced, by subject matter,
or by relationship to particular issues. Conceptually, these sorts of
reforms, whatever the precise form they might ultimately take, would
direct the informational advantages inuring to defendants toward
illuminating merits-based	
   issues.	
   This	
   would	
   transform	
   defendants’	
  
strategic incentives under the regime of plenary discovery from one of
foisting immense search costs upon plaintiffs and obscuring the facts
most salient to the underlying claims to ones of maintaining organized,
easily searchable and retrievable files and of keeping manageable the
task of organizing materials produced.
2.

Rethinking the Assumption that the Proper Role of Pretrial
Adjudicative Mechanisms Is Limited to Screening Out Meritless
Cases
The presumption that the litigation process should (or at least

165 This Article leaves for another day needed consideration of whether doctrines
regarding evidentiary privileges and work product doctrines, in current form, impede the
exchange of information in a manner that would help generate merits-based settlements.
166 See generally John K. Setear, The Barrister and the Bomb: The Dynamics of
Cooperation, Nuclear Deterrence, and Discovery Abuse, 69 B.U. L. REV. 569 (1989) (applying
the	
  game	
  theory	
  principles	
   of	
  nuclear	
  deterrence	
  to	
  parties’	
  decisions whether to engage in
abusive discovery practices).
167 As a preliminary matter, the Rules Advisory Committee should consider the extent to
which it would help, in some instances, to have special masters with expertise in
particularized substantive areas guide issue-targeted discovery. This could help
informationally disadvantaged claimants craft narrower requests, either in the first
instance, or after a limited period of initial discovery on a given issue.
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does) culminate in the adjudication of cases on the merits at trial, and
that pretrial adjudication should be limited to screening out meritless
cases, undergirds the 1938 regime of notice pleading, liberal discovery,
and summary judgment. As discussed above, under current rules, the
resolution of factual disputes and the application of substantive law to
the evidence occur at trial, and pretrial adjudicative mechanisms
employ standards that provide little guidance about the factual
strength of claims.168
This assumption too is unworkable in a world of settlement for
two fundamental reasons. First, the minimal merits screening
currently provided by pretrial procedures is inadequate to mitigate the
effects of the external forces detailed in Part II that can cause
settlements to deviate from the dictates of the substantive law. By
design, screening mechanisms simply exclude claims from the
litigation system altogether. They do little to reduce the level of
variance generated by surviving claims, mitigate the costs associated
with discovery on surviving claims, or eliminate non-case-dispositive
legal uncertainties that bear on settlement decisions.
Second, current pretrial rules are inadequate to provide the kind
of robust information about the substantive merits that can narrow
parties’	
   disparate	
   evaluations	
   of	
   the	
   value	
   of	
   their	
   claims	
   and	
   guide	
  
settlement negotiations toward merits-reflective case resolution. In a
world dominated by settlement, pretrial rules can no longer be viewed
primarily as way-stations on the road to what is now a virtually
nonexistent	
   endpoint.	
   Instead,	
   if	
   parties’	
   settlement	
   decisions	
   are	
   to	
  
reflect in meaningful ways the merits of the underlying claims, pretrial
rules must be harnessed (or created, where necessary) to provide
parties with more meaningful merits-based guidance for settlement.
To address both of these problems, pretrial procedures should be
reformed to enable courts to provide more meaningful merits-based
guidance for settlement decisions. Moreover, where appropriate,
courts’	
   pretrial	
   merits-based guidance should have operational
consequences	
  for	
  parties’	
  access	
  to	
  additional	
  procedural mechanisms
that can distort settlement outcomes. This section illustrates these
principles by setting forth for further consideration examples of
reforms at the pleading stage and at subsequent stages of the litigation.
a. Harnessing Pleading-Stage Procedural Mechanisms To
Provide More Robust Merits-Based Guidance
The fundamental precept behind notice pleading, introduced in

168

See supra Part II.A.2.
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1938, is simply to provide defendants with notice of claims brought
against them. Notice pleading was not designed to provide an
opportunity for the evaluation of the strengths or weaknesses of
claims. Over time, however, critics of notice pleading expressed
concern that this regime allowed meritless cases to proceed to
discovery and engender settlements that were based largely, if not
exclusively, on distortive effects such as discovery costs and high levels
of variance in outcomes. In an attempt to ameliorate these concerns, in
2007 the Supreme Court introduced a more rigorous pleading-stage
screen: the plausibility standard.169
While the	
   Supreme	
   Court’s	
   plausibility	
   standard	
   was	
   a	
   reaction	
   to	
  
the problem of cost imposition as a distortive force on settlement
outcomes, the standard is seen to be inadequate from the standpoint of
this	
   Article’s	
   focus	
   on	
   better	
   aligning	
   settlement	
   outcomes with the
merits of underlying claims. First, the new plausibility standard is
overbroad and may well screen out potentially meritorious cases,
because no mechanism exists at the pleading stage for recalibrating
informational imbalances that may favor defendants at that stage of
litigation. Second, the new standard does nothing to mitigate the
potential for claims that survive the motion to dismiss stage to
generate the very distortions about which the Court was concerned
when it articulated a new pleading standard—namely, the distortions
that stem from the costs, and threat of costs, of the open-ended
discovery process. This concern about discovery-related distortions
creates a vicious feedback loop: It may well exacerbate the first
problem with the plausibility pleading standard—that is, it can be
applied too broadly to overscreen even meritorious claims—because
the concern puts pressure on courts to evaluate the strength of claims
regardless of whether plaintiffs could have produced factual
information sufficient to support a plausibility analysis at such an early
juncture in the litigation process.
Instead, the plausibility pleading standard, as part of a properly
designed pleading stage of litigation, could be harnessed as a
mechanism for guiding settlement decisions. To do so, however, the
169 See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 559 U.S.
662	
   (2009).	
   The	
   Court’s	
   decisions in these cases issue yet another challenge to the evereroding assumption that, under the Federal Rules, there is a bright-line separation between
questions of fact and law. See, e.g., Epstein, supra note 99, at 72 (describing Twombly as the
culmination of a trend in lower courts towards disapproval of a rigid division between fact
and law). This challenge was embedded in the Iqbal opinion, wherein the Court noted that
the	
   plaintiff’s	
   complaint	
   cited	
   information	
   available	
   to	
   the	
   public	
   that	
   actually	
   disproved	
  
plaintiff’s	
   claims.	
   See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 681–82	
   (considering	
   plaintiff’s	
   claims	
   of	
  
discrimination	
  and	
  offering	
  an	
  “obvious	
  alternative	
  explanation”	
  for	
  the	
  conduct	
  described	
  
in the complaint (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 567)).
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pleading stage at which this plausibility standard operates should be
reformed. Fundamentally, the pleading stage should be conceptualized
not as a binary switch for screening out claims, but rather as a more
flexible mechanism for providing merits-based guidance to parties
early in the litigation process. Accordingly, the pleading Rules should
be supplemented with mechanisms that would enable courts to
perform this merits-based analysis in a factually informed way.
Again, recent, isolated procedural reform proposals are better
situated as part of the broader enterprise of changing pleading-stage
procedures to foster merits-based guidance for settlements. One set of
proposals suggests that Rule 12 be supplemented with an analog to
Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)), so as to permit a party facing a
motion to dismiss to request discovery in relation to a particular claim
or set of claims.170 Under this new mechanism, plaintiffs would be
required to show that public information available to them is
“insufficient,”	
   without	
   discovery,	
   to	
   satisfy	
   the	
   plausibility	
   pleading	
  
standard.171 Another proposal seeks to harness the strategic incentives
of the parties themselves in producing the relevant information for a
plausibility analysis. Presented specifically with regard to the scienter
requirement in securities litigation, Professor Geoffrey Miller proposes
that a plaintiff be given the option to file an objection to the grant of a
motion to dismiss for failure to state a plausible ground for relief, at
which	
   time	
   the	
   court’s	
   order	
   would	
   be	
   vacated	
   and	
   litigation	
   would	
  
proceed to discovery.172 However, the defendant could obtain
reimbursement for post-dismissal	
  attorney’s	
  fees	
  if	
  summary	
  judgment	
  
is later granted.173
As a preliminary matter, these two proposals reflect an
understanding of the changed informational architecture of modern
litigation at the pleading stage. In particular, these proposals can be
understood conceptually as challenging the supposition, embedded in
the 1938 regime of notice pleading, that defendants will tend to control
key information bearing on the merits of the dispute at the pleading
170

See FED. R. CIV. P. 12, 56(d).
See Colin T. Reardon, Note, Pleading in the Information Age, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2170,
2206 (2010) (describing such a reform); see also Scott Dodson, New Pleading, New
Discovery, 109 MICH. L. REV. 53, 79 (2010) (proposing mechanisms of pleading-stage
discovery analogous to the former Rule 56(f)). A related, but far more limited proposal is
that plaintiffs should be fined or subject to a stricter set of penalties under the existing Rule
11 for abject failure to perform a pre-filing investigation of their claims. Bone, Regulation of
Court Access, supra note 6, at 931–32 & n.243.
172 Geoffrey P. Miller, A Modest Proposal for Securities Fraud Pleading After Tellabs 17–18
(New York University Law and Economics Working Papers, Paper No. 265, 2011), available
at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/265.
173 Id.
171

GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2012]

11/15/2012 9:26 AM

THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT

147

stage. This assumption is less accurate today. Indeed, scholars have
begun to trace a historical shift in informational asymmetries,174
finding that technological and regulatory changes have made relevant
factual information more available and have made informal methods of
investigation simpler and less expensive.175 In some subsets of cases,
then, plaintiffs may be able to provide sufficient factual support for
claims without discovery, or at least enough to survive a motion to
dismiss even under a plausibility pleading standard.176
Moreover, these proposals are promising steps toward enabling
courts to provide, and parties to obtain, meaningful merits-based
information at the pleading stage. Furthermore, some mechanism of
preliminary discovery at the pleading stage could reduce the extent to
which defendants can exploit informational imbalances in motions to
dismiss.177 Viewed within the framework of this Article, however, to
174 See Reardon, supra note 171, at 2171 (describing developments since 1938 that have
eased informational asymmetries, including lower search costs due to the internet, the
related	
   ease	
   of	
   spreading	
   and	
   difficulty	
   of	
   containing	
   “damning	
   information,”	
   and	
   the	
  
emergence	
   of	
   laws	
   and	
   regulations	
   “forcing	
   or	
   facilitating	
   the	
   disclosure of once-private
information”).
175 Along	
  these	
  lines,	
  Richard	
  Epstein	
  argues	
  that	
  the	
  Court’s	
  decision	
  in	
  Twombly can be
better defended with reasoning about changes in informational architecture. See Epstein,
supra note 99, at 81–82 (viewing Twombly as articulating a preference against discovery
when the complaint relies upon public information). Reasonable minds can and do differ as
to whether the information available to the public about an alleged antitrust conspiracy in
Twombly (or about antitrust conspiracies more generally) is sufficient for plaintiffs to
satisfy the plausibility standard. See, e.g., Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 6, at
919–20 (noting that in Twombly, the defendants had a great deal of information relevant to
potential liability, while the plaintiffs had very little).
176 The internet is of course a big part of this story. Websites provide claimants and
attorneys with access to information about potential defendants and alleged wrongdoing;
indeed, some of these sites are government-sponsored and specifically designed to do so.
See, e.g., Filings & Forms, SEC.GOV, http://www.sec.gov/edgar.shtml (last updated Feb. 21,
2012) (providing a public interface for viewing corporate SEC filings); RECALLS.GOV,
http://www.recalls.gov (last visited Oct. 22, 2012) (collecting product recall information
from several agencies in a central database). Internet-based background-checks permit
users to locate public records of companies or individuals. See, e.g., Pricing, KNOWX,
http://www.knowx.com/statmnts/priceinfo.jsp (last visited Oct. 22, 2012). Even social
networking sites provide key factual information about relevant claims. See Sean Wajert,
Informal Discovery Leads to Dismissal in MDL, MASS TORT DEF. (Feb. 2, 2010),
http://www.masstortdefense.com/2010/02/articles/informal-discovery-leads-todismissal-in-mdl/	
   (discussing	
   a	
   case	
   in	
   which	
   “plaintiff’s	
   claims	
   of	
   severe	
   disability were
refuted by [Facebook] photos . . . that appeared to show plaintiff competing in strenuous
high-speed	
   powerboat	
   races”).	
   Furthermore,	
   a	
   number	
   of	
   laws	
   now	
   mandate	
   or	
   facilitate	
  
the production of information about investigations and occurrences of wrongdoing. See
generally Reardon, supra note 171, at 2191–99 (cataloguing laws regulating information
disclosure).
177 As another variant of this idea, FED. R. CIV. P. 27 could be revised to permit pre-suit
discovery not just for purposes of perpetuating testimony, but also for preliminary
investigation of claim viability, proper parties to sue, and the like. Such arrangements have
begun to emerge in a few states, most prominently Texas. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 202.

GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

148

11/15/2012 9:26 AM

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:nnn

better harness pleading-stage procedures and to provide parties with
merits-based guidance for settlement evaluations, such reforms
require further refinement and additional reforms may be needed.
To begin, a Rule 56(f)-equivalent mechanism should be refined to
provide judges with more concrete guidance for determining whether
pleading-stage discovery is warranted than is afforded by a highly
discretionary	
   “insufficiency”	
   standard.	
   Of	
   course,	
   the	
   formulation	
   of	
  
such guidance would likely require empirical studies, conducted
perhaps by the Rules Advisory Committee (through the FJC) to
determine the extent to which certain types of cases are characterized
by substantial amounts of information available pre-discovery.
Moreover, empirical research is needed to help the Advisory
Committee determine, and then articulate in the relevant new rule,
what	
   it	
  means	
   for	
  information	
   to	
   be	
   “available.”	
   At	
  the	
   very	
   least,	
   to	
   be	
  
“available,”	
   information	
   must	
   be	
   capable	
   of	
   being	
   cost-effectively
obtained and presented in a way easily understood by potential
claimants.178
Research along these lines would help the Advisory Committee
provide judges with a concrete list of factors for determining whether
pleading-stage discovery is warranted, thereby cabining unfettered
discretion and better assuring that such analysis is not thwarted by
judges’	
  own	
  informational	
  disadvantages.	
  As	
  examples,	
  the	
  committee	
  
could direct judges toward a presumption in favor of permitting
limited pleading-stage discovery in (1) cases involving claims that
require	
   a	
   showing	
   of	
   defendant’s	
   mental	
   state	
   or	
   discriminatory	
  
animus;179 (2) cases involving defendants who are otherwise not
subject to significant regulatory disclosure requirements generally;180
(3) cases involving plaintiffs who were denied requests for information
under, for instance, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA),181 or,
relatedly, have waited out to no avail the statutory response deadline
for agencies provided in FOIA;182 (4) cases in which publicly available
178 See, e.g., Glover, supra note 23, at 1182 (illustrating the advantage public regulators
have in compiling and analyzing information in the context of a broad landscape of complex
data, such as the consumer financial market); see generally Samuel Issacharoff, Disclosure,
Agents, and Consumer Protection, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 56 (2011)
(discussing the need for market agents who can present information to consumers in an
understandable way that might generate operational choices).
179 See, e.g., Dodson, supra note 171, at 67 (discussing employment discrimination
plaintiffs’	
  lack	
  of	
  access	
  to	
  information).	
  
180 See Reardon, supra note	
  171,	
  at	
  2203	
  (warning	
  that	
  “plaintiffs	
  suing	
  firms	
  in	
  lightly	
  
regulated	
   industries”	
   are	
   likely	
   to	
   face	
   the	
   greatest	
   amount	
   of	
   informational	
   asymmetry	
  
given the lack of regulatory disclosure requirements).
181 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006).
182 See PETE WEITZEL, SUNSHINE IN GOV’T INITIATIVE, FEWER REQUESTS, FEWER RESPONSES,
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information about the activities alleged is contained in the
informational disseminations of defendants themselves, who have a
strategic incentive ex ante to present selectively any information about
their nature, activities, or operations in public fora; or (5) cases in
which plaintiffs do not have access to relevant technological resources
for obtaining claim-related factual information. These characteristics
would tend to indicate that information relevant to wrongdoing is
unlikely	
  “publicly	
  available.”
Conversely, factors suggesting that information relevant to
wrongdoing is “publicly	
   available”	
   to	
   plaintiffs	
   for	
   purposes	
   of	
  
plausibility pleading include: (1) whether claims are based upon
allegations of activities that are subject to regulatory disclosure
requirements;183 (2) whether a case involves claims whose basic
factual predicates could be established through online research of
publicly available, independently operated sites;184 (3) whether
plaintiffs could (but did not) make a request for information under,
say, FOIA;185 or (4) whether plaintiffs in a given case have access to
relevant technological resources for obtaining claim-related factual
information. Analysis of these sorts of factors would of course require
the judge to consider the particular characteristics of a given case in
applying them (though, of course, not all of these factors would arise in
every case), especially given the risk that parties would invoke
boilerplate language in motions either seeking to obtain or seeking to
prevent pleading-stage discovery. However, such factors would
provide for a more bounded and predictable exercise of discretion
than is typically found in current rules.
More fundamentally, a new procedural rule for limited pleadingstage discovery should not carry with it a rebuttable presumption that
plaintiffs in all cases can obtain information sufficient to survive a
plausibility analysis without discovery. This point is equally applicable
to the potential introduction of a Rule 56(f)-equivalent mechanism or a
MORE
DENIALS
2
(2009),
available
at
http://www.sunshineingovernment.org/stats/highlights.pdf (finding that agencies miss the
statutory response deadline in a majority of cases).
183 For instance, the recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act contains a number of provisions that require disclosures by regulated
entities. See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
111-203, § 115, 124 Stat. 1376, 1403–06 (2010) (to be codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5325)
(detailing one form of enhanced public disclosure). Of course, the efficacy of such disclosure
provisions	
  will	
  require	
  research	
  of	
  the	
  Act’s	
  practical	
  effects	
  in	
  the	
  coming	
  years.	
  
184 For a discussion of the sorts of elements that can be supported factually through
online research of publicly available websites, see Reardon, supra note 171, at 2188–90.
185 See id. at	
   2204	
   (“FOIA	
   disclosures	
   can	
   likewise	
   reveal	
   little-known government
policies	
  and	
  provide	
  detail	
  on	
  their	
  operation.”).
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conditional motion to dismiss. Regarding the former, a showing of
need for pleading-stage discovery under the currently proposed
Rule 56(f)-equivalent mechanism will impose additional costs upon
plaintiffs—costs which may well be justified in some subset of cases,
but might be entirely wasteful and potentially distortive of settlements
in
cases
characterized
by
an
informational
monopoly on the part of defendants.186
Requiring a showing of need for discovery in all cases creates a
presumption insensitive to such distinctions. And for cases in which
defendants possess informational advantages relative to the plaintiff
and to the judge, this sort of rebuttable presumption would more
readily enable defendants to exploit informational asymmetries
through complex and selectively informed Twombly motions and
oppositions	
   to	
   plaintiffs’	
  required	
  showing	
   under	
  the	
   new	
   Rule	
   56(f)derived mechanism. That strategic exploitation could in turn drive
potentially meritorious claims out of the system or force down early
settlement values for reasons unrelated to the underlying merits. A
rebuttable presumption in the other direction, however, harnesses the
strategic incentives of the party almost assuredly in possession of
information	
   relevant	
   to	
   claimants’	
   allegations—the defendant—to
make the court and plaintiffs aware of the sources of public
information.
Similarly, a conditional motion to dismiss may work well when
plaintiffs can reasonably be expected, pre-discovery, to have
meaningful access to relevant facts; however, for cases characterized
by significant informational imbalances—for example, cases involving
employment discrimination187—the potential fee-shift may simply chill
claiming.188 It	
   is	
   true,	
   as	
   Miller	
   notes,	
   that	
   plaintiffs’	
   option	
   to	
   drop	
  
their case prior to summary judgment to avoid fee-shifting may
mitigate such a concern,189 at least in some cases.190 But that just leaves

186 For example, informational asymmetries may occur in cases involving wrongdoing
that occurred in private and cases involving	
   questions	
   about	
   a	
   defendant’s	
   mental	
   state,	
  
discriminatory intent, or small or closely-held companies. Id. at 2203.
187 Chilling effects are particularly problematic to the extent that they are pronounced in
areas of the law where Congress relies heavily (or exclusively) on private parties for the
policing of wrongdoing. See Glover, supra note 23, at 1148–49 (discussing the shifting
reliance by Congress on private party litigation for the regulation of employment
discrimination).
188 It is not entirely clear whether a fee-shifting mechanism could be introduced by the
Rules Advisory Committee under its limited rulemaking power or if Congress must
introduce such a regime. This Article does not take up that debate.
189 Miller, supra note 172, at 19.
190 The option	
  to	
  drop	
  one’s	
  case	
  may	
  not	
  sufficiently	
  mitigate	
  this	
  concern	
  for	
  cases	
  in	
  
which claimants are at a significant informational and pecuniary disadvantage.
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in place the distortive forces associated with the discovery process.191
By postponing a factually informed plausibility analysis until the
statistically unlikely summary judgment stage, without additional
mechanisms in the discovery process to mitigate either the
exploitation of informational asymmetries or the imposition of
substantial discovery costs, the conditional motion to dismiss may well
leave intact the same sorts of distortive effects on settlement outcomes
present in the current regime.192
One way to address these problems would be to provide for a Rule
56(f)-equivalent mechanism for plausibility pleading—rebuttable
presumption and all—only when the judge determines, guided by
specific factors articulated by the Advisory Committee in the new rule
itself, that plaintiffs can reasonably be expected to access relevant
information in the public domain.193 Such a regime would be
supplemented, at least in close cases, with a conditional grant of a
motion to dismiss with a cost-shifting regime, as well as additional
mechanisms designed to provide merits-based guidance throughout
the discovery process to mitigate the distortive effects of unfettered
discovery.194
Another way to address these problems would be to use a
plausibility pleading standard for all claims (which holds promise,
appropriately modified, not only to provide parties with more robust
merits-related information earlier in the litigation), but to incorporate
an additional rebuttable presumption in favor of limited discovery at
the pleading stage. Such a reform would harness the strategic
incentives of the defendant to produce relevant, publicly available
information in opposing pleading-stage discovery, at least in the subset
of cases or claims the Rules Advisory Committee determines likely
191

See generally supra Part II.A.2.
Even if, in light of a fee-shifting threat, parties more robustly analyzed the likelihood
of success at summary judgment, such analysis would likely not reliably mitigate these
effects,	
  particularly	
  given	
  attorneys’	
  tendencies	
  to	
  overestimate	
  their	
  likelihood	
  of	
  success	
  
on the merits. See Goodman-Delahunty et al., supra note 90, at 137, 140–41 (presenting
empirical data suggesting that lawyers are prone to overconfidence about their cases).
193 There is precedent for limited pleading-stage discovery: Judges often allow targeted
discovery before deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter or personal
jurisdiction. It is unclear whether judges have authority to do so under the Federal Rules
when deciding a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim when faced with heightened
pleading standards. Compare In re Graphics Processing Units Antitrust Litig., 527 F. Supp. 2d
1011, 1032–33 (N.D. Cal. 2007) (noting that narrowly-tailored discovery might be
permitted before the plaintiff filed an amended complaint, provided that such discovery is
deemed necessary), with In re Flash Memory Antitrust Litig., No. C 07-0086 SBA, 2008 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 62278, at *29 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 4, 2008) (stating that there is no authorization in the
Federal Rules for pre-dismissal discovery).
194 See infra Part III.A.2.b.
192
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warrant such discovery.
As another alternative, particularly for cases in which the
rebuttable presumption regarding pleading-stage discovery
appropriately favors such discovery, pleading would be a two-stage
process. Under this regime, for the subset of cases for which the
Advisory Committee has determined that public information regarding
wrongdoing is unlikely to be available to would-be plaintiffs, an initial
evaluation	
  of	
  the	
  complaint	
  would	
  be	
  made	
  under	
  the	
  “no	
  set	
  of	
  facts”	
  
standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson.195 After this, limited discovery
would be conducted in preparation for a more robust evaluation of
whether	
   plaintiffs	
   have	
   stated	
   a	
   “plausible”	
   claim	
   for relief. The goal of
such a reform, like the other possible reforms discussed in this section,
would be to harness pleading-stage procedures to enable courts to
introduce meaningful merits-based information earlier in the litigation
process.
b. Creating Post-Pleading-Stage Mechanisms that Provide
Meaningful Merits-Based Guidance
The presumption that meaningful merits-based analysis should
occur only after the conclusion of the discovery process also fails in a
world of settlement, in two key respects. First, parties tend to make
settlement evaluations after the motion to dismiss and during the
discovery process; therefore, if analysis of the merits of claims by
someone	
   other	
   than	
   the	
   parties	
   themselves	
   is	
   to	
   influence	
   parties’	
  
settlement decisions, mechanisms for such analysis are needed during
that stage of the litigation. Second, the current rules lack mechanisms
that would enable courts to manage the impact of external forces on
settlement outcomes by tying merits evaluations to access to discovery
procedures.
Once more, recent reform proposals are better resituated as
challenging the continued viability of a foundational assumption of the
Federal Rules: the assumption that robust merits analysis should occur
at the end of the discovery process. For example, Geoffrey Miller has
recently	
   suggested	
   the	
   introduction	
   of	
   a	
   “preliminary	
   judgment”	
  
mechanism whereby parties could obtain a nonbinding assessment of
the merits of the dispute.196 Through a preliminary judgment, the judge
would evaluate claims or defenses based on information provided by
195 355 U.S. 41, 45–46 (1957). Such a regime implicitly rejects the new—and equally
incorrect—foundational premise injected into the Federal Rules by Twombly and Iqbal that,
across the entire swath of cases brought in federal court, plaintiffs have access to public
information sufficient to support their claims under the heightened standard.
196 Geoffrey P. Miller, Preliminary Judgments, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 165, 165 (2010).

GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2012]

11/15/2012 9:26 AM

THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT

153

the parties, and the judgment would be available at any time upon a
party’s	
   request,	
   presuming	
   the	
   court	
   concludes	
   that	
   the	
   materials	
  
presented are sufficient to make such a provisional assessment.197
Once issued, the judgment	
   would	
   “convert	
   into	
   a	
  final	
   judgment	
   after	
  
the	
   expiration	
   of	
   a	
   reasonable	
   period	
   of	
   time,”	
   but	
   before	
   the	
  
expiration of that time period, the party against whom the judgment is
entered could object, with or without explanation, thus causing the
order to be vacated.198 This early-issuing, merits-based assessment
would, Miller argues, encourage settlement by better enabling the
convergence	
   of	
   parties’	
   respective	
   expected-value calculations;
mitigate	
   parties’	
   tendencies	
   to	
   hold	
   fast	
   to	
   original	
   anchors	
   about	
  
expected values; trigger serious settlement negotiations that are more
focused on the issues of the case; help counter nuisance suits; and
increase transparency, presuming such judgments would be publicly
available.199
Miller’s	
   proposal	
   offers	
   a	
   valuable	
   corrective to the outdated
presumption that robust merits-based adjudication will enter the
lawsuit at the end of the litigation process. And such a reform could
dovetail with the new pleading and discovery mechanisms proposed
above. However, this proposal does not go far enough.
Although a preliminary judgment mechanism would help address
the	
   current	
   pretrial	
   procedures’	
   failure	
   to	
   provide	
   useful	
   information	
  
about the merits of the dispute with any real rigor,200 the proposal does
not fully address the other key reason that parties need such meritsbased analysis: the distortions of settlement outcomes generated by
the access to and use of discovery procedures. To mitigate these
distortions and better align settlement outcomes with the merits of
disputes, access to and use of pretrial procedures must be tied to
merits-based analysis. Put simply, a preliminary judgment mechanism
must	
  generate	
  operational	
  consequences	
  for	
  the	
  parties’	
  use	
  of	
  pretrial	
  
procedures. This is the basic intuition behind a recent doctrinal shift in
the context of Rule 23, lauded by some procedure scholars201 and
decried by others,202 toward greater merits scrutiny at the class
197

Id. at 169.
Id. at 167–69.
199 Id. at 168, 175–76, 181, 183.
200 See supra Part II.A.1.
201 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certification and the Substantive
Merits, 51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1331 (2002) (imploring courts to evaluate the merits of the
plaintiffs’	
   cases	
   before	
   certifying	
   in	
   order	
   to	
   align	
   the	
   settlement-inducing power of
certification with the likelihood of success on the merits); Richard Marcus, Reviving Judicial
Gatekeeping of Aggregation: Scrutinizing the Merits on Class Certification, 79 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 324, 372 (2011) (calling this shift toward merits scrutiny	
  a	
  “positive	
  development”).
202 See, e.g., Michael J. Kaufman & John M. Wunderlich, The Unjustified Judicial Creation of
198
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certification stage.203 This shift has been motivated by the recognition
that allocation of a procedural entitlement—the ability to proceed as a
class under Rule 23—generates a great deal of variance, and that
access to this variance should be granted in correlation with the
dictates of governing law in a given dispute.
Along these lines, if a preliminary judgment indicates that a
party’s	
   likelihood	
  of	
   success	
   on	
   a	
   particular	
   issue	
  is	
   low,	
   but	
   carries	
   no	
  
consequences for the allocation of procedural entitlements—for
instance,	
   if	
   that	
   judgment	
   does	
   nothing	
   to	
   change	
   a	
   party’s	
   ability	
   to	
  
impose significant discovery costs—then the ability of costs to distort
settlement outcomes will remain largely unmitigated and will perhaps
dwarf	
   the	
   impact	
   of	
   a	
   preliminary	
   judgment	
   on	
   parties’	
   settlement	
  
valuations. Conversely, if a preliminary judgment indicates that a party
is likely to succeed on a particular issue, but does nothing, for instance,
to	
   adjust	
   the	
   opposing	
   party’s	
   ability	
   to	
   foist	
   substantial	
   discovery	
  
costs through voluminous production, noticing of multiple depositions,
or discovery requests on collateral matters, then the preliminary
judgment again will have failed to mitigate the effect of that cost
imposition on the ultimate settlement. Indeed, without a connection to
the dispensation of procedural entitlements, the valuable merits-based
data generated by these preliminary judgments risk being outweighed
by the ongoing effects of procedural distortions for purposes of
settlement valuations. And, as a result, judges would likely have little
incentive to invest the time and effort required to provide an early
assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the claim.
A modified proposal, therefore, could take the following form: A
preliminary judgment that is issued after discovery on a discrete issue
under a targeted discovery regime should directly inform the
allocation of additional discovery entitlements. After the issuance of
the preliminary judgment, the judge could permit additional discovery

Class Certification Merits Trials in Securities Fraud Actions, 43 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 323, 323
(2010) (arguing against the practice of merits-based certification because of inconsistencies
with legal precedent, infringement upon the right to a jury, and unfounded fear of postcertification discovery costs); Steig D. Olson, “Chipping	
  Away”:	
  The	
  Misguided	
   Trend	
   Toward	
  
Resolving Merits Disputes as Part of the Class Certification Calculus, 43 U.S.F. L. REV. 935, 939
(2009)	
   (contending	
   that	
   this	
   shift	
   “make[s]	
   class	
   certification	
   a	
   more	
   onerous	
   and	
   less	
  
efficient	
  process”).
203 See In re Hydrogen Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305,	
   316	
   (3d	
   Cir.	
   2008)	
   (“An	
  
overlap between a class certification requirement and the merits of a claim is no reason to
decline to resolve relevant disputes when necessary to determine whether a class
certification	
  requirement	
  is	
  met.”);	
  In re Initial Pub. Offering Sec. Litig., 471 F.3d 24, 27 (2d
Cir.	
  2006)	
  (holding	
  “that	
  the	
  fact	
  that	
  a	
  Rule	
  23	
   requirement	
  might	
  overlap	
  with	
  an	
  issue	
  on	
  
the	
   merits	
   does	
   not	
   avoid	
   the	
   court’s	
   obligation	
   to	
   make	
   a	
   ruling	
   [at	
   the	
   pretrial	
   stage]	
  as	
  to	
  
whether the requirement is	
  met”).
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on a given issue beyond what was already provided by the targeted
discovery phase; however, such additional discovery could carry a
cost-shifting mechanism—either against the requesting party (if some
higher showing of merits related to the relevant claim is not made after
further discovery), or against the producing party (if additional
discovery reveals that the producing party had withheld key materials
or information).
For illustration, consider the following hypotheticals. First,
assume	
   that	
   a	
   claimant’s	
   ultimate	
   success	
   on	
   the	
  merits	
   turns	
   largely	
  
on one element of a particular claim. Assume further that the claimant
has survived the	
   defendant’s	
   motion	
   to	
   dismiss.	
   Also	
   assume	
   that	
  
plenary discovery on all elements of the relevant claim would be costly
and that those costs would affect settlement values. Discovery would
be initially limited to matters related to the concrete allegations about
the crucial element, after which a preliminary judgment would be
made. Further discovery would not be permitted unless, on
preliminary judgment, some heightened showing of entitlement to
relief in line with those allegations or very closely related allegations is
made. Or, if no such showing is made at that point, the parties are
made subject to cost-shifting if either no additional showing is made
(by claimant) or further production reveals that the responding party
(usually the defendant) had been withholding information.
Now assume, as a second hypothetical, that plaintiffs file a
complaint alleging three claims for relief, all of which survive the
motion to dismiss stage, either as it currently exists, or under some
modified discovery regime at the pleading stage. Assume again that
discovery on all three claims would be costly and that those costs
would influence settlement values. Also assume, however, that one of
the three claims carries with it the potential entitlement to substantial
damages relative to the other two claims because, for instance, one of
the claims arises under a statute containing treble damages or
statutory penalties. Here, pinpoint discovery would be conducted on
the high-damages claim alone, after which the judge would issue a
preliminary, nonbinding evaluation of the strengths of that claim.204
204 Particularly in cases characterized by significant informational imbalances, the
timing for the issuance of a preliminary judgment might also prove critical. To the extent the
judge is at an informational disadvantage about the facts of the dispute (as can often be the
case),	
  tying	
  the	
  issuance	
  of	
  a	
  preliminary	
  judgment	
  to	
  a	
  party’s	
  request	
  creates	
  a	
  strategic	
  
incentive for the informationally advantaged party to obscure damaging facts. That party,
perhaps through production to the court of either voluminous or selectively revealed
information,	
   could	
   create	
   the	
   appearance	
   that	
   “sufficient”	
   information	
   exists	
   for	
   the	
  
rendering of the preliminary judgment. Therefore, the timing for the issuance of a
preliminary judgment is more appropriately tied to the end of a discrete discovery phase,
which will better ensure that presentation of relevant materials to the judge is provided
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Such an evaluation would not only help align settlement calculations
with the underlying merits and damages entitlements by providing
merits-based information and reducing the level of variance in the
case, but, crucially, it would also dictate the extent to which further
discovery would be permitted. For instance, if the judge determines
that	
   the	
   claimants’	
   likelihood	
   of	
   success	
   on	
   that	
   claim	
   is	
   low,	
   further	
  
discovery on that claim could be permitted, but subject to a costshifting mechanism should plaintiff fail to make a further showing of
the	
   claim’s	
   merit	
   (or	
   against	
   defendants	
   if	
   it	
   is	
   revealed	
   that	
  
information has been withheld). Or, if the judge determines that the
plaintiffs’	
   likelihood of success on the merits of a claim is high, the
judge should supervise discovery with a view toward ensuring that
plaintiffs have access to additional discovery for purposes of proving
that claim. In either case, such judgments would impose limitations on
discovery on any additional issues that exert relatively little influence
on settlement decisions. These procedural consequences would help
further illuminate information most relevant to settlement and reduce
the potentially distortive effect of cost imposition on ultimate
settlement values.
3.

Rethinking the Assumption that Procedural Rules Should Apply
Uniformly and Transsubstantively to All Cases

The Federal Rules were designed to apply uniformly, meaning that
they apply across all federal jurisdictions and to all cases brought in
those jurisdictions.205 They were also designed to apply
transsubstantively, meaning that they apply to all cases, regardless of
the substance of underlying claims.206 I am certainly not the first to
challenge the continued viability of these foundational principles, as a
general matter.207 To begin, scholars have argued that the
through the lens of both parties.
205 Rule	
   1	
   provides	
   that	
   “[t]hese	
   rules	
   govern	
   the	
   procedure	
   in	
   all	
   civil	
   actions	
   and	
  
proceedings	
   in	
   the	
   United	
   States	
   district	
   courts,”	
   with	
   those	
   limited	
   classes	
   of	
   cases	
  
enumerated in Rule 81 providing the only exceptions. FED. R. CIV. P. 1; FED. R. CIV. P. 81.
These foundational principles are generally understood to constrain the rulemaking process
under the Rules Enabling Act. See Stephen B. Burbank, Pleading and the Dilemmas of
“General	
   Rules,” 2009 WIS. L. REV. 535, 541–42 [hereinafter Burbank, Pleading]. Professor
Burbank has argued, however, that the Rules Enabling Act does not necessarily command
such an interpretation. See Burbank, The Transformation of American Civil Procedure: The
Example of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1934–35 (1988) (questioning whether the
legislative history of the 1934 Rules Enabling Act requires transsubstantive rules).
206 See, e.g., David Marcus, The Past, Present, and Future of Trans-substantivity in Federal
Civil Procedure, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 371, 376 (2010) (setting forth the meaning of
transsubstantivity).
207 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion: The Supreme Court, Federal
Rules and Common Law, 63 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 716–17 (1988) [hereinafter Burbank, Of
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transsubstantive and uniform nature of the Federal Rules is actually a
bit	
   fictitious,	
   given	
   judges’	
   discretion	
  in	
   the	
   application	
   of	
   those	
   rules	
  
to various cases208 (discretion that has been more formally embodied
in changes to the Federal Rules over time).209 Further, as the range of
complexity in federal cases has grown, lower federal courts have
struggled against the constraints of these principles210 and Congress
has enacted tailored rules for certain doctrinal areas.211 In addition,
some scholars have challenged these principles directly by proposing
substance-specific procedural reforms,212 while others have challenged
them more indirectly, through theoretical critiques of unbounded
judicial discretion.213 That said, scholars acknowledge that these
principles still maintain a strong hold on rulemaking.214
Viewing the principles of transsubstantivity and uniformity
through the lens of this Article provides an additional perspective—
namely, that they can impede achievement of aligning settlement
outcomes with the merits of underlying disputes. These principles tend
to be insensitive to the fact that different subsets of cases, or subsets of
Rules and Discretion] (basing his argument that strict adherence to procedural
transsubstantivity is untenable on the fact that specialized procedural rules and approaches
already exist, such as in the case of RICO lawsuits, civil rights litigation, and complex
litigation); Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity,
Divergence, and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1999, 2025 (1989) (noting
the	
  emergence	
  of	
  “procedures	
  for	
  particular	
  types	
  of	
  cases”).
208 See, e.g., Stephen B. Burbank & Linda J. Silberman, Civil Procedure Reform in
Comparative Context: The United States of America, 45 AM. J. COMP. L. 675, 699–700 (1997)
(describing transsubstantive procedure as a myth, given the amount of discretion trial
judges have); Paul D. Carrington, Politics and Civil Procedure Rulemaking: Reflections on
Experience, 60 DUKE L. J. 597, 621–22, 644 (2010) (citing jury impaneling and Rule 11
sanctions in illustrating the breadth of procedural discretion granted to judges). But see
Marcus, supra note 206, at 378 (arguing that this claim about the relationship between
judicial discretion and transsubstantivity sweeps too broadly).
209 See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (laying out various procedures that grant judges increased
discretion during a case); see also Steven S. Gensler, Judicial Case Management: Caught in the
Crossfire, 60 DUKE L.J. 669, 674–88 (2010) (describing rules and legislative enactments that
give judges a great deal of case-management discretion).
210 See Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. REV. 551, 567–90 (2002)
(describing	
  lower	
  courts’	
  efforts	
  to	
  forge	
  substance-specific pleading requirements).
211 Marcus, supra note 206, at 404–09 (discussing legislatively created and substancespecific procedural reforms).
212 See, e.g., Burbank, Of Rules and Discretion, supra note 207, at 716–17 (arguing that
civil rights cases might need special procedural rules to accommodate their distinctive
attributes).
213 See Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 113, at 2006 (arguing that the Rules Advisory
Committee is better positioned to determine which types of cases call for which types of
procedural rules).
214 See Robert G. Bone, “To	
   Encourage	
   Settlement”:	
   Rule	
   68,	
   Offers	
   of	
   Judgment, and the
History of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1561,	
  1619	
  (2008)	
  (“The	
  
idea that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should apply uniformly to all substantive law
claims . . . still has a strong hold on rulemaking	
  today.”).
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claims, will be vulnerable to different settlement-distorting forces and,
thus, may call for different procedural mechanisms. Procedural
reforms should be attentive to such distinctions and, more
importantly, should provide courts with guidance regarding how and
when to use particular tools.
Begin with the principle of uniformity. As one example, to the
extent that cases generate substantial levels of variance—as may be
true with, say, statutory claims implicating treble damages and
penalties—the allocation of procedural entitlements should take into
account the potentially distortive effect of that variance. In such
instances, settlement pressure will be acute, so limited discovery at the
pleading stage would generally be advisable to narrow the width of the
potential settlement range and also to ensure that pleading-stage,
merits-based evaluation neither underscreens the settlement
pressure-generating claims nor overscreens them simply because of
their potential to generate variance. Moreover, targeted discovery in
cases that carry high levels of variance would ideally begin with
discovery related only to the variance-generating claims—as it is those
claims	
   that	
   are	
  most	
   likely	
   to	
   exert	
   influence	
   over	
   parties’	
   settlement	
  
decisions.
As another example, for cases characterized by pronounced
informational asymmetries that advantage defendants, either a
presumption in favor of limited discovery in conjunction with a
plausibility pleading standard or, absent such discovery, a more
permissive pleading standard is needed. Moreover, to reduce the
number of costly and broad discovery requests made by uninformed
plaintiffs in such cases, a targeted discovery plan should focus on
unearthing facts, key search terms, and primary custodians of
information related to the most critical issues first. For this subset of
cases, discovery plans could be organized, to the extent possible, in a
graduated fashion such that claimants can develop more specific
discovery requests on those claims as they gather more relevant
information. And depending on the complexity of the case, cases
characterized by significant informational asymmetries should
appropriately require defendants to organize produced materials to
lead the court and the claimant to key facts (or the absence thereof)
and to prevent the imposition of high search costs that would obscure
those facts.
In addition, for the subset of relatively non-complex cases, which
need very little discovery, if any215 (for instance, cases involving simple
215 Further empirical work is needed to determine the prevalence of these sorts of cases.
One report, provided over ten years ago, indicated that a fair number of cases in federal
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breach of contract claims or claims arising out of a straightforward
automobile accident), current rules permitting broad discovery and
reforms aimed at mitigating the distortive effects of factors like cost
imposition216 and variance are not just largely unnecessary; they are
also strategically exploitable for purposes of rendering claims
economically prohibitive or driving settlement outcomes downward
(or upward, to the extent they are deployed by a plaintiff). Accordingly,
we should bear in mind that palliative rules for the distortive
procedural warfare of complex cases may serve as barriers to entry for
plaintiffs with low- or medium-value cases and as weapons for
resource-advantaged parties in others.
Indeed, for these sorts of less complex cases—where the potential
for non-merits factors such as cost imposition, variance, and
informational asymmetries to distort settlements is also lower—
procedural mechanisms should, if anything, be simplified, particularly
for cases that arise in areas in which the law is clear. Specifically,
simplified or fast-tracked versions of the Federal Rules may well be in
order.217 This is particularly true if we seek to include in the system of
public litigation—as I believe we should—these	
  more	
  “ordinary”	
  cases.	
  
In	
   fact,	
   for	
   these	
   “ordinary”	
   cases,	
   rather	
   than	
   introduce	
   new	
   or	
  
additional procedures, reform efforts should instead be directed at
eliminating the advantages enjoyed by repeat players who currently
control electronic settlement databases, and toward informational
equality by systematically requiring disclosure by both plaintiffs’	
   and	
  
defense attorneys of basic settlement information attendant to these
cases.
The need for procedural distinctions among cases with vastly
different stakes and levels of complexity is not just a matter of
ensuring access to justice.218 It is also a matter of bringing into the
court did not need discovery, but that in the cases that did have discovery, discovery costs
accounted	
   for	
   ninety	
  percent	
  of	
  litigants’	
  costs.	
  Memorandum	
  from	
  Judge	
  Paul	
  V.	
  Niemeyer,	
  
Chair, Advisory Comm. on Civil Rules, to Judge Anthony J. Scirica, Chair, Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (May 11, 1999); 192 F.R.D. 354, 357 (2000). However, both the data
coverage and findings in that report have been questioned. See, e.g., Miller, From Conley,
supra note 2, at 58 n.226. That said, given that there likely exists some subset of cases in
which plenary discovery is unnecessary, it makes little sense to leave those cases vulnerable
to the potential exploitation of discovery practices permitted by the Federal Rules.
216 See supra Part III.A.1.
217 Setting forth details of such potential tracks is the subject of future work, which
would build on that of modern procedure thinkers along these lines. See, e.g., Burbank,
Pleading, supra note 205, at 537–38, 545 (expressing support for the development of
separate tracks for cases, depending on their underlying characteristics).
218 Indeed,	
   there	
   is	
   a	
   strong	
   suspicion	
   among	
   scholars	
   that	
   complex,	
   “Cadillac”	
  
procedures are pricing more modest cases involving low- or even medium-value claims out
of the system. See Samuel Estreicher, Beyond Cadillacs and Rickshaws: Towards a Culture of

GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

160

11/15/2012 9:26 AM

NEW YORK UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87:nnn

system of litigation the public value of precedents, and perhaps, with
adequate simplicity in these ordinary cases, the public value of trials,
which could serve as informal bellwethers for settlements in more
complex cases arising under similar liability theories. Such signals
would also produce efficiency gains for the settlement market overall.
Beyond the principle of uniformity, different substantive claims
warrant different procedural treatment as well. Different types of
substantive claims are likely susceptible to different types of
distortions, and as such, the problems attendant to the principle of
uniformity apply equally to such substantive claims. In other words,
abandoning the principle of uniformity will also lead to a weakening of
the principle of transsubstantivity.219
More importantly, though, the principle of transsubstantivity is
independently problematic because it forecloses consideration—
potentially by Congress—of the importance of private enforcement
through litigation to the substantive regulatory scheme in striking the
appropriate balance between achievement of regulatory goals and
mitigation of settlement-distorting forces. For example, some
substantive claims—say, complex antitrust claims—systematically
tend to require significant discovery and, under a transsubstantive
regime, call for procedural mechanisms that stringently police the
costs of such discovery. Substantive policy considerations, however,
may warrant increased tolerance for the potentially distortive forces of
costs or variance with respect to claims like employment
discrimination which, as I have discussed in prior work, play an
important role in an overall regulatory scheme.220 Where private
litigants play a less crucial role in regulating harms, however,
procedural mechanisms that mitigate the effects of costs and variance
may be more desirable. In other words, procedural reform that rejects
the principle of uniformity only gets us so far; in some instances,
whether and to what extent to adopt certain reforms could depend on
the particular substantive area of the law upon which such reforms
would operate.
Citizen Service, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 323, 325–27 (2005).
219 A point of clarification is in order. Consistent with the approach taken by scholars
who have proposed substance-specific procedural reforms, it is not my argument that we
should adopt entirely separate procedural regimes for every different body of substantive
law. This is not a call, for instance, for a return to the common-law writ system. See, e.g.,
Stephen N. Subrin, The Limitations of Transsubstantive Procedure: An Essay on Adjusting the
“One	
   Size	
   Fits	
   All”	
   Assumption, 87 DENV. L. REV. 377,	
   388	
   (2010)	
   (“Those	
   who	
   cherish	
  
transsubstantive procedure are right that we do not want to return to . . . the writ
system . . . .”).
220 See Glover, supra note 23, at 1449 (tracing how Congress relied in large part upon
private litigation to enforce employment discrimination laws).
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As another example, there are certain substantive laws that tend
systematically to generate low-value claims, and tend systematically to
stem from alleged wrongdoing that occurred on a large scale.221 In such
instances, there is a concern that defendants may exploit cost
imposition to avoid liability as to any individual case, and thus to avoid
liability in the aggregate, unless plaintiffs can bring their claims as a
class or unless plaintiffs have access to other mechanisms that make
low-value claiming economically viable. As I have explored in more
detail in prior work,222 this is arguably the concern underlying recent
cases invalidating class action waivers and the broader debate about
the use of procedural private ordering to require arbitration and to
prohibit the use of the class action device in cases involving these types
of low-value claims.223
In these situations, there are two competing sources of settlement
distortion: the variance generated by the certification of a class, on the
one hand, and the strategic imposition of prohibitive costs through
robust motions to dismiss and offensive plenary discovery practices on
the other. To the extent that	
   defendants’	
   exculpation	
   from	
   liability	
   is	
  
concerning, a number of nontranssubstantive, non-uniform procedural
consequences follow. For example, the ability to prohibit the class
action by contract—at least without providing adequate additional
mechanisms to enable claiming224—should be constrained for certain
221 For example, employment discrimination cases often concern low-value claims held
by low-wage earners. See generally Michael Selmi, The Value of the EEOC: Reexamining the
Agency’s	
   Role	
   in	
   Employment	
   Discrimination	
   Law, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 32–40 (1996) (noting
that the vast majority of race and gender discrimination cases brought by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission involved low-value claims and often featured lowwage earners as plaintiffs).
222 J. Maria Glover, Beyond Unconscionability: Class Action Waivers and Mandatory
Arbitration Agreements, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1735, 1740–47 (2006) (describing how the
prevalence of contracts of adhesion provides an increasingly greater opportunity for class
action waivers to effectively prohibit low-value claims).
223 See id. at 1761 (describing how class action waivers undermine the central
justifications for giving arbitration a favored status).
224 Such	
   mechanisms	
   began	
   appearing	
   in	
   what	
   are	
   known	
   as	
   “third-generation”	
  
arbitration clauses. For example, AT&T implemented such an arbitration clause in 2006,
which	
   “allocates	
  the	
  entire	
   cost	
  of arbitration	
  [on	
   meritorious	
   claims]	
   to	
  [the	
   defendant]”;	
  
“permits	
   either	
   party	
   to	
   proceed	
   in	
   small	
   claims	
   court”;	
   “contains	
   no . . . limitation on the
arbitrator’s	
   authority	
   to	
   award	
   punitive	
   damages”;	
   “provides	
   for	
   a	
   minimum	
   award	
  
(denominated	
  a	
  ‘premium’)	
  if	
  the	
  arbitrator	
  awards	
  the	
  customer	
   more	
  than	
  the	
  amount	
  of	
  
[the	
   defendant’s]	
   last	
   settlement	
   offer”;	
   and	
   provides	
   that	
   the	
   defendant	
   will	
   “pay	
   [the	
  
customer’s]	
   attorney,	
   if	
   any,	
   twice	
   the	
   amount	
   of	
   attorneys’	
   fees,	
   and	
   reimburse	
   any	
  
expenses.”	
  Brief	
  of AT&T Mobility LLC as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 14–
16, T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Laster, 553 U.S. 1064 (2008) (No. 07-976). Such mechanisms come
with their own problems, see Glover, supra note 23, at 1166–67, but they are certainly
better than the alternative: no mechanisms to enable claiming and no class action device. At
the very least, courts should insist that some of these mechanisms be in place in order for
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subsets of substantive rights that tend to generate low-value claims
and for which enforcement by private parties is needed to deter
wrongdoing. For instance, this measure might be warranted in cases
involving claims like those brought under the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA) for wage-and-hour violations—claims that are of typically small
value for any given individual and that are brought under a statute
characterized by significant levels of under-enforcement by the
relevant public regulatory body.225 Further, and putting aside for the
moment the issue of contractual class action prohibitions, the
requirements of Rule 23 may well warrant relaxation in such cases,
perhaps after a more robust, factually informed	
  analysis	
  of	
  the	
  claims’	
  
merits prior to that relaxed certification analysis.
Conversely, and given the unique ability of class certification to
generate high levels of variance for substantive areas of the law not
typified by a tendency to generate low-value claims, the strictures of
Rule 23 might warrant tightening if a preliminary, factually informed
analysis of the merits indicates that the underlying claims are weak.
Alternatively, or in addition, class certification could be granted
conditionally in such cases, with the ultimate decision about
certification dependent upon a further showing, after a limited period
of discovery, of a greater likelihood of success on the merits. Indeed,
such	
   reforms	
   could	
   well	
   mitigate	
   the	
   Court’s	
   concerns	
   in	
   Twombly
about permitting access to significant discovery cost imposition and
about the high level of variance generated by the certification of a
class.226 Such reforms would also address concerns, voiced by
Twombly’s critics, that defendants likely possessed the information
relevant	
   to	
   plaintiffs’	
   allegations	
   of	
   conspiracy	
   under	
   the	
   Sherman	
  
Act.227 Specifically, as one example, such reforms would have permitted
the Twombly plaintiffs to obtain limited preliminary discovery
regarding the alleged existence of an agreement by defendants to
violate the antitrust laws, while providing a mechanism for more
robust	
   evaluation	
   of	
   the	
   plausibility	
   of	
   plaintiffs’	
   claims	
   before	
   they	
  
could obtain class certification and proceed further in the litigation.
To say that the foundational principles of uniformity and
contracts containing class waivers to survive an unconscionability analysis.
225 Glover, supra note 23, at 1150–51.
226 As I have explored in prior work, a stricter approach to class certification in cases
alleging antitrust conspiracy is less concerning as a matter of overall regulation of such
misconduct, given fairly robust public enforcement of antitrust violations. Glover, supra
note 23, at 1158–59	
   (discussing	
   the	
   Department	
   of	
   Justice’s	
   amnesty	
   program	
   for	
  
whistleblowers reporting Sherman Act violations).
227 See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note 6, at 919–20	
   (“[T]he defendant [in
Twombly had] a great deal of information relevant to liability and the plaintiff [had] very
little . . . .”).
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transsubstantivity must be revisited is not to advocate that reform
should occur primarily through the ad hoc and burdensome case-bycase exercise of judicial discretion. There are a number of architectural
challenges to mediating among these various concerns. These
challenges are best addressed by the Advisory Committee,228 which can
commission broad-based empirical studies, and which can then craft
procedural	
  rules	
  that	
  channel	
  judges’	
  discretion	
  through	
  the	
  inclusion	
  
of as much concrete guidance on these issues as possible. Moreover, in
some instances, particularly those in which countervailing distortions
exist—for example, claims that generate variance on the one hand but
are susceptible to cost exploitation by defendants against plaintiffs
with small-value claims on the other—Congress may need to make
substantive policy judgments, as it has done before in limited
contexts.229 Indeed, Congress is perhaps best positioned to determine
whether—as a matter of the enforcement of the underlying
substantive law in light of overall regulatory objectives,230 as a matter
of access to justice,231 or	
  as	
  a	
  matter	
  of	
  the	
  “moral	
  weight”	
  which	
  one	
  
might attach to certain substantive rights232—it is better to permit a
little more variance through, say, class certification, than it is to leave
such claims unremedied. Once these first-order determinations are
made, judicial discretion regarding the particulars of a given case
would proceed more predictably and systematically.
All of the potential reforms set forth above necessarily warrant
more exhaustive consideration than can be provided here. They are
offered here as examples of reforms that should be part of the redesign
of current procedural rules for a world of settlement. Further, they lay
the groundwork for the development of procedural tools that would
break free from the underlying principles of the Federal Rules (which
are ill-suited to a world of settlement) would address the factors
228 Bone, Who Decides?, supra note 113, at 1963 (arguing that trial judges face serious
problems in tailoring case-specific procedures that work well in the highly strategic
environment of litigation).
229 See Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context: A
Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1530 n.365 (2008) (citing the Truth in Lending
Class Action Relief Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-12, 109 Stat. 161 (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 1640 (2006))).
230 See Glover, supra note 23, at 1146–52	
   (describing	
   Congress’s	
   position	
   in	
   assessing	
  
public and private enforcement mechanisms to obtain its enforcement objectives).
231 See Glover, supra note 222, at 1736–37 (arguing that class action waivers, in certain
substantive contexts, may effectively prevent broad swaths of potential plaintiffs from
vindicating substantive rights and may effectively enable defendants to avoid liability under
certain statutes).
232 See Bone, Regulation of Court Access, supra note	
   6,	
   at	
   914	
   (“Many	
   people	
   assign	
  
substantial moral weight to constitutionally protected interests, including, and perhaps
especially, the interests	
  protected	
  by	
  the	
  First	
  Amendment.”).
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tending to unmoor those settlements from the merits of underlying
disputes, and would direct pretrial procedures more purposefully
toward generating merits-based	
   information	
   relevant	
   to	
   parties’	
  
settlement decisions. In short, they pave the way toward procedures
designed for a world of settlement.
B.

A New Vision of Procedures Designed for a World of Settlement

From the challenges issued above, as well as from the examples of
reform proposals situated therein, a new vision for a system of
procedure in a world of settlement emerges. At a conceptual level,
rethinking the assumptions identified above and moving toward
reform require, fundamentally, a redefining of the relationship
between procedure—in particular, pretrial procedure—and guidance
regarding the substantive merits of a given case. Whereas under the
current rules, pretrial procedure is viewed largely as separate from,
and antecedent to, robust examination of the merits, in a world of
settlement, merits evaluation and pretrial procedure must be both
temporally interconnected and operationally interdependent.
More specifically, a new system of procedure should harness
pretrial procedural mechanisms to provide meaningful merits-based
guidance for settlement decisions and to address the distortive effects
of external forces on those decisions. Moreover, merits-based guidance
generated	
  through	
   pretrial	
   procedures	
  should	
  influence	
   parties’	
  access	
  
to procedural mechanisms. In short, procedural reform should foster,
rather than merely avoid interfering with, the fundamental goal of our
litigation system—to align case outcomes with the dictates of
substantive law.233
This new vision has broader implications for the world of modern
litigation. First, it calls for a partial retreat from the highly
discretionary, nontransparent, and unbounded forms of managerial
judging that have dominated the litigation landscape in the past

233 At some level, this new vision of procedure requires rethinking the 1938 reformers’	
  
“hands	
   off”	
   procedural	
   approach. First,	
   this	
   “hands	
   off”	
   approach perpetuates a fiction;
scholars have long recognized that procedure significantly impacts the functioning of
substantive law. See, e.g., Thomas O. Main, The Procedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87
WASH. U. L. REV. 801,	
  802	
  (2009)	
  (“Procedure	
  is	
  an	
  instrument	
  of	
  power	
  that	
  can,	
  in	
  a	
  very	
  
practical sense, generate	
  or	
  undermine	
  substantive	
  rights.”); Stephen B. Burbank & Tobias
Barrington Wolff, Redeeming the Missed Opportunities of Shady Grove 30 (Univ. of Pa. Law
Sch. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 10-31, 2010),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1677608. Second, the
“hands	
   off”	
   approach	
   stands	
   as	
   an	
   impediment	
   to	
   meaningful	
   reform:	
   Procedure	
   cannot	
  
simply be viewed as a potential problem; rather, it must also be viewed as part of the
solution.
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decades.234 Procedural reforms along the lines suggested above
provide for a more robust adjudicative and transparent role for judges
during the pretrial phase of litigation. Moreover, they direct the
exercise of judicial discretion under those procedural rules explicitly,
and	
  more	
  concretely,	
  toward	
  guiding	
  parties’	
  settlement	
  decisions	
  with	
  
merits-based considerations.
Second, and relatedly, evaluation of the merits prior to settlement,
even in a non-case-dispositive setting, would reinvigorate the public
dimension of private litigation235 by promoting an increase in judicial
pronouncements of the law. Such pronouncements would help resolve
existing legal uncertainties and add transparency to a system of
litigation dominated by settlement. Further, public pronouncements of
the	
   law	
   in	
   one	
   case	
   hold	
   promise	
   to	
   orient	
   parties’	
   litigation	
   and	
  
settlement decisions around merits-based considerations in future
cases.
Third, this new vision of procedure calls for institutional
commitments to the fundamental precept that our procedural system
should aid in the effectuation of substantive law. Introducing more
robust pretrial evaluation of case merits may well require additional
institutional resources.236 At the same time, there is reason for some
optimism that these additional resource demands would be tempered
by efficiencies that reform would also create. For example, redesign of
the Federal Rules for a world of settlement—and in particular,
redesign that includes mechanisms that provide concrete and explicit
guidance to judges in performing pretrial tasks—may well redirect the
resources currently devoted to managerial tasks. Further, appropriate
reforms	
  would	
  help	
  narrow	
  parties’	
  settlement	
  ranges	
  in	
  a	
  given	
  case	
  
and therefore promote settlements more quickly, and moreover, could
generate merits-based information that would guide parties in future,
similar cases—both of which could reduce demands on the judicial
234 See, e.g., Gensler, supra note 209, at 720 (describing how the Federal Rules have
continued	
  to	
  rely	
  heavily	
  on	
  a	
  “tradition	
  of	
  discretion”).	
  The	
  notion	
  of	
  highly	
  discretionary	
  
judging has deeper roots vis-à-vis	
   the	
   Federal	
   Rules,	
   as	
   it	
   “lay	
   at	
   the	
   heart	
   of	
   Pound’s	
  
jurisprudence.”	
  Tidmarsh,	
  supra note 1, at 521.
235 See generally Fiss, supra note	
   5,	
   at	
   1085	
   (“[The	
   job	
   of	
   the	
   judicial	
   official	
   is	
   to]	
  
explicate and give force to the values embodied in authoritative texts such as the
Constitution and statutes: to interpret those values and to bring reality into accord with
them.”).
236 Such additional resources could well come in the form of court-annexed arbitrators,
mediators, or subject-matter-expert special masters, whose discretion to perform pretrial
tasks should ideally be bounded by the reforms set forth herein. Such arrangements give
rise to a number of questions regarding, for instance, institutional competence, mechanical
operation, and—more broadly—the appropriate theoretical and normative underpinnings
of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms more generally. Such questions are for
another day.
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system. Finally, in implementing reforms, Congress and the Advisory
Committee should consider whether some of the additional pretrial
tasks suggested here, perhaps including the management of targeted
discovery, could be entrusted to special masters, magistrate judges, or
other judicial officers whose role it would be to aid judges and parties
in the pretrial process.
This Article poses a foundational challenge to the current design
of our Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. And without doubt, enacting a
new set of procedures for a world of settlement will not be without its
costs. However, the costs of redesign cannot be considered in a
vacuum. Ultimately, any costs of reform must be weighed against the
costs of current procedures to parties, judges, and the civil justice
system overall—costs that are exceedingly high and frequently
distortive of settlement outcomes. Indeed, the merits-related	
   “goods”	
  
generated by current pretrial procedures—specifically, cursory meritsbased signals—are frequently dwarfed by the impact of various nonmerits factors on settlement outcomes. Given the faint shadow these
signals	
   cast,	
   these	
  “goods”	
   may	
   not	
   be	
   worth	
   their	
   high	
   price.	
   Finally,	
  
the current procedural system comes at a substantial cost to our
system of litigation because it fails meaningfully to achieve its own
purported foundational goals. These social costs cannot be ignored.
Reform is needed to ensure that the content of substantive law, and
not	
   an	
   arbitrary	
   and	
   distorted	
   settlement	
   “market	
   price,”	
   orders	
  
behavior, deters misconduct, and makes victims of wrongdoing whole.
The costs associated with careful redesign of our procedural system to
better achieve these goals and to meet the demands of a world of
settlement may thus be well worth it.
CONCLUSION

The world of settlement is here to stay, and it is time to face it
head-on. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, designed for a bygone
world of trials, are increasingly unable to fulfill their animating goal
that cases be resolved on their merits, as defined by the governing
substantive law. Procedural reform is needed to grapple with the
unique difficulties generated by settlement as the dominant form of
case resolution in achieving this objective.
This Article has laid the groundwork for designing a new
procedural regime by challenging foundational assumptions of the
Federal Rules that no longer hold in a world of settlement, and by
offering reforms that break free from these underlying tenets. It has
also presented a new vision for our procedural system that expressly
integrates pretrial procedure with meaningful merits-based

GLOVER-FIN (DO NOT DELETE)

December 2012]

11/15/2012 9:26 AM

THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL SETTLEMENT

167

determinations. In offering this new vision of procedure, this Article
seeks both to invite further exploration of avenues of procedural
redesign and to guide the way for needed empirical work on such
reforms. Meaningful and effective reform will not come quickly or
easily, but ultimately, such reform ought to come.

